Supply response of sugarcane farmers in Thailand by Pinyopusarerk, Maneerat
SUPPLY RESPONSE OF SUGARCANE FARMERS IN THAILAND 
by 
Maneerat Pinyopusarerk, B. Econ. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Agricultural Development Economics in 
The Australian National University 
September, 1977 
•jpi^^mm m atoa^^ nm^mm m tzmnnm wttfgv^ 
, 2 -
% 
. A ' 
» r 
' i 
f 
••••'ji' m.1'-
B 'M 
* 
D E C L A R A T I O N 
Excejit where otherwise i n d i c a t e d , t h i s 
d i s s e r t a t i o n i s my own work. 
Maneerat Pinyopusarerk 
September, 1977 
(iii; 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to acknowledge the large intellectual debt that I owe to 
my supervisor, Dr John W. Froebairn, of the Department of Economics, 
Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. 
His criticisms and comments throughout the study have been extremely 
useful. 
I wish also to thank the Australian Government for offering me 
the Colombo Plan Scholarship which made this study possible. 
In the early period of the study. Professor Thomas H. Silcock's 
advice and suggestions gave me the insight to deal with the problem 
under study. I am very grateful to him. 
To Dr Mark Saad, of the Department of Economics, Research School 
of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, whom I owe 
more than can be expressed here. His suggestions and assistance in 
the work are extremely appreciated. 
I wish also to express my sincere gratitude to Dr Dan Etherington, 
of the Department of Economics, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
who not only gave me useful suggestions for the study, but also provided 
moral support which was most important for the completion of this study. 
My sincere thanks also go to Mr Alan McDonald who made himself 
available whenever I needed his help and guidance. I am very grateful 
to him. 
Last, but not least, I -owe a great deal to my family who not only 
provided a constant source of love and inspiration, but also data 
necessary for the study. 
Maneerat Pinyopusarerk 
(iv) 
ABSTRACT 
Sugar is one of the major exports of Thailand and sugar-
cane is the most important raw material used in producing sugar. 
Time series data for 8 years from 1957/68 to 1974/75 were analysed to 
estimate a supply response function for sugarcane farmers in 4 regions 
of Thailand, viz. Central, Eastern, Northern and North-eastern regions. 
A priori, farmers' decisions on the sugarcane planted area were expected 
to be influenced by relative expected profitability per rai of sugar-
cane, the level of rainfall at the sowing period, the influence of the 
Sugarcane Farmers' Association, the activity of quotaman, the cost of 
inputs, and Government intervention. 
Relative expected profitability per rai is defined as 
expected price per tonne of sugarcane times its expected yield per 
rai (i.e. gross return) divided by the product of expected price per 
tonne of the competing crop and its expected yield per rai. Expected 
yield was found by regressing yield over time. Farmers' price 
expectation formations were specified using the Nerlovian Expectation 
and the Naive models. 
Due to unavailability and unreliability of data, many 
variables were inevitably dropped. The general model was simplified 
and adjusted. Good fits, therefore, were not obtained. However, it 
was found from the study that farmers in two regions, viz. Eastern, 
and North-eastern regions have an inelastic supply response function. 
It is only farmers in the Northern region which have an elastic supply 
;v) 
response function ranging from 2.00 to 5.52 depending on differing 
expectation models and the use of differing techniques. 
Policy recommendations, consequently, were not made 
because of the inadequacy of the results obtained. 
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CHAPTER i 
INTRODUCTION AND SETTING 
1.1 The Importance of Agriculture in the Thai Economy 
The Thai economy is based on agriculture. Agriculture 
is the most important source of income and employment for the majority 
of the Thai people. The percentage share of employment (of people of 
15 years of age and over) in agriculture in 1960 was 81.6 per cent^ 
2 but in 1959 it had decreased to 78.3 per cent. 
Table 1.1.1 shows the percentage of share of GDP classi-
fied by industrial origin from 1963 to 1974. 
It can be seen that the share of agriculture dropped from 
36.08 per cent in 1963 to 27.86 per cent in 1971. Since then it has 
increased; however, a trend cannot be readily identified due to the 
short period under consideration (i.e. only 4 years from 1971 to 1974), 
Agricultural products constitute the bulk of the merchandise exports 
of the country. In 1968 and 1969 more than 70 per cent of export 
revenue was earned through the sale of agricultural products abroad. 
In 1964, revenue from the rice premium system yielded 12.4 per cent 
of Government revenue but in 1970 it fell to 2.9 per cent. 
1 1960 Population Census. 
2 Labour Force Survey 1969. 
TABLE 1.1.1 
SHARE OF GDP CLASSIFIED BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN 
Year 
IndustrialX 1963 
Origin 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Agriculture 36. 08 33. 49 34. 85 36. 50 32. 47 31. 51 31. 91 28. 53 27. 86 30. 42 33. 91 31. 93 
Mining and 
Quarrying 1. 20 1. 67 2. 08 1. 92 1. 90 1. 80 1. 89 2. 03 2. 06 1. 78 1. 34 1. 77 
Manufacturing i4. 18 13. 98 14. 21 13. 72 14. 84 14. 99 14. 69 15. 93 17. 56 17. 28 17. 01 17. 46 
Construction 5. 33 5. 60 5. 58 6. 00 6. 83 6. 97 6. 60 6. 08 5. 09 4. 42 3. 88 4. 03 
Electricity 0. 63 0. 71 0. 80 0. 88 1. 00 1. 11 1. 19 1. 20 1. 32 1. 38 1. 24 1. 05 
Transport 7. 03 7. 32 7. 09 6. 24 6. 29 6. 24 6. 09 6. 28 6. 50 6. 39 5. 81 5. 75 
Wholesale 16. 25 18. 01 16. 51 16. 82 17. 53 17. 29 17. 53 19. 06 17. 74 17. 12 18. 27 20. 04 
Banking 2. 39 2. 56 2. 63 2. 78 3. 17 3. 46 3. 69 4. 14 4. 34 4. 27 4. 09 4. 49 
Ownership 2. 63 2. 56 2. 44 2. 16 2. 15 2. 07 1. 96 2. 01 2. 13 1. 95 1. 63 1. 53 
Public 
Administration 4. 63 4. 42 4. 26 3. 76 3. 96 4. 25 4. 26 4. 51 4. 63 4. 44 3. 86 4. 04 
Services 9. 65 9. 67 9. 55 9. 12 9. 85 10. 30 10. 19 10. 23 10. 76 10. 55 8. 95 7. 90 
Source: National Accounting Office, NEDB. 
M 
"As a starting point it can be assumed that Thai 
agriculture produces the raw materials for the 
following industries: food, beverages, tobacco, 
wood, furniture, leather and rubber. These 
seven identical branches produced around fifty 
per cent of the total GDP originating from manu-
facturing in 1968 and 1969. Of course, these 
industries import some of the raw materials they 
use. However, this seems to be more than compen-
sated for by the fact that agriculture supplies 
part of the raw material for the textiles industry. 
Thus, it appears safe to state that agriculture 
produces the raw materials for at least fifty per 
cent of Thailand's industrial production."^ 
Table 1.1.2 shows the findings of the study conducted 
by the NEDB, the "Rural Manpower Utilization Study", in 1969-197 0 
in four project areas - Ayuthaya, Chiangmai, Nam Phong and Phu Wieng. 
TABLE 1.1.2 
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES: CASH AND KIND (%) 
Food Non-Food Total 
Project Area — — — — 
Cash Kind Cash Kind Cash Kind 
Ayuthaya 64 36 99 1 83 17 
Chiangmai 43 57 75 25 55 45 
Nam Phong 19 81 90 10 47 53 
Phu Wieng 12 88 90 10 43 57 
Source: Friedrich W. Fahs and Jan Vingerhoets "Rural Manpower, Rural 
Institutions and Rural Employment in Thailand", Manpower 
Planning Division, NEDB, Bangkok, 1972. 
3 Op. cit., p. 3. 
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It can be observed that in the non-food categories, the 
consumption expenditure in cash is significantly higher than in kind 
in all project areas. If it can be assumed that the goods in the 
non-food categories are from industrial and other non-agricultural 
sectors, we can conclude from the study that the agricultural sector 
is a market for products from the non-agricultural sector. 
1.2 The Importance of Sugarcane 
Sugar is one of the important export items of Thailand 
and sugarcane is the indispensable raw material used for producing 
sugar. Table 1.2.2 shows the amount of sugar exported and its value 
from 1957 to 1975. Domestic consumption is also shown in the table. 
In 1972, sugar was the sixth highest export commodity 
earning about 3.6 per cent of total export income. In 1974, export 
sales and export prices increased substantially and sugar became the 
fourth largest export commodity, earning about 8.4 per cent of total 
export income that year. 
Since sugarcane is the important raw material in producing 
sugar, availability of sugarcane is very important in determining the 
export value and the profitability of the sugar factory. If there is 
a low supply of sugarcane during a good year in the sugar export 
market, sugarcane factory prices will be higher because the sugar 
factories are competing to buy sugarcane from the farmers. The next 
year, farmers may produce more sugarcane which may result in lower 
cane prices. 
Table 1.2.3 compares the price of sugarcane and sugar, 
and the quantity and area of sugarcane produced from 1961-1962 to 
1973-1974. It can be seen that the two prices are closely related. 
When the sugar price falls, the sugarcane price falls and vice versa; 
this relationship holds except for the two periods, i.e. 1965-1956 
and 1972-1973 when the price of sugar rose but the price of sugarcane 
fell (1965-1966) and in 1972-1973 when the price of sugar fell but 
the price of sugarcane rose. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.1. 
Sugarcane is grown in all regions except the southern 
part of Thailand. Thailand has 72 provinces altogether but the sugar-
cane centres are in the following provinces: 
Central Region 
1. Kanchanaburi 
2. Rajburi 
3. Nakornpathom 
4. Supanburi 
5. Singhburi 
6. Ang-Thong 
7. Uthaithani 
8. Chainat 
9. Pejburi 
10. Prachuabkirikan 
1. Chiangmai 
2. Lampang 
3. Utaradit 
4. Kampaengpej 
Northern Region 
5. Pitsanulok 
6. Pichitr 
7. Nakornsawan 
1. Choi±>uri 
2. Rayong 
Eastern Region 
3. Chantaburi 
4. Chachoengsao 
4 Sugar price cannot be compared with that of ISA and domestic 
because sugar sold through ISA is raw sugar whereas sugar sold 
domestically is white sugar. There are no statistics available 
on domestic price of raw sugar. 
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FIGURE 1.2.1 
PRICE OF SUGAR AND SUGARCANE, PRODUCTION 
OF SUGARCANE FROM 1961 to 1974 
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North-Eastorn Region 
1. Buriram 3. Udornthani 
2. Nakornpanom 
A map depicting these provinces is shown on page 4. 
All the four sugar regions have very fertile soil and 
good ecological conditions for growing sugarcane. The rainfall which 
is good for growing is between 1500-2000 millimetres annually. Sugar-
cane in Thailand is a 12 month crop. In the Central, North and Eastern 
regions, the farmers plant at the onset of the rainy season, i.e. 
about May-June. But in the North-eastern region, they plant sugarcane 
in November. Its ratoon can be grown with quite a high yield level 
for a further 2 years. According to the survey done by the Sugar 
Institute in 1975, the varieties that are grown in each region are: 
Northern Region - L.T.4, F.144, Pindar, Q.83 and Trojan. 
Central Region - F.140, F,148, F.154, Pindar, Q.83 and F.137. 
Eastern Region - F.134, F.153, F.148 and Pindar. 
North-eastern Region - H.38-2915, Pindar and NC0.310. 
Costs of production are shown in Table 1.2.1. 
TABLE 1.2.1 
COST OF PLANTING SUGARCANE (BAHT/RAI) 
Year New Sugarcane Ratoon 
1971-72 1162 728 
1972-73 1037 659 
1973-74 1398 682 
1974-75 2105 1330 
1975-76 2335 1370 
Source: Sugar Institute. 
The increase in cost is mainly in the payment of seedlings. 
The seedling cost in 1975-76 was twice that in 1974-75 and 4 times 
that in 1971-72. Interest paid by farmers also increased from 50 baht/rai 
in 1971-72 to 165 baht/rai in 1975-76. Transport cost increased from 
34 baht per tonne in 1971-72 to 60 baht per tonne in 1975-76. The 
labour cost for applying fertilizer also changed markedly from 70 baht 
per rai in 1971-72 to 250 baht per rai in 1975-76. 
TABLE 1.2.2 
AMOUNT AND VALUE OF SUGAR EXPORTED 
Year Amount Exported (Tonnes) 
Value of Exports 
(Millions of Baht) 
Domestic Consumption 
(Tonnes) 
1957 3,541 6 73,087 
1958 82 - 88,626 
1959 450 1 96,289 
1960 5,723 8 119,475 
1961 1,537 3 125,077 
1962 43,019 46 81,945 
1963 52,823 122 117,854 
1964 48,908 211 233,067 
1965 85,834 100 184,317 
1966 54,858 82 233,726 
1967 15,013 37 238,804 
1968 52 - 324,459 
1969 16,102 47 357,559 
1970 56,248 94 364,680 
1971 174,571 382 312,302 
1972 407,501 1,264 362,316 
1973 275,405 1,161 382,298 
1974 443,847 3,757 400,000 
1975 595,434 5,696 n. n. 
Source: Department of Customs. 
TABLE 1.2.3 
PRICE OF SUGARCANE AND SUGAR, 
AREA PLANTED TO SUGARCANE AND PRODUCTION 
(1961-62 TO 1973-74) 
10 
Year Area Planted (Rai)* 
Production 
(Tonne) 
Sugarcane Price 
(Baht/tonne) 
Retailed Sugar 
Price 
(Baht/tonne) 
1961-62 441,334 2,195,853 118.22 454 
1962-63 344,982 1,694,533 119.80 521 
1963-64 452,000 2,387,185 153.98 542 
1964-65 532,000 3,912,788 117.87 296 
1965-66 523,000 3,044,850 102.87 337 
1966-67 361,379 2,534,660 161.18 370 
1967-68 447,777 2,379,430 203.65 452 
1968-69 646,243 4,399,067 150.97 391 
1969-70 738,583 5,102,268 136.22 341 
1970-71 861,806 6,585,861 144.90 399 
1971-72 872,494 5,925,566 150.45 453 
1972-73 1,133,439 9,512,794 179.72 439 
1973-74 1,616,304 12,694,491 199.64 473 
Source: Sugar Institute. 
* 1 hectare = 6.17 rais 
TABLE 1.2.4 
SHARE OF SUGARCANE, MUNGBEAN, CASSAVA, RICE IN GDP 
ORIGINATING FROM CROPS (%) 
(1962-63 TO 1974-75) 
11 
Year Sugarcane Mungbean Cassava Rice Others 
1962-63 2.87 1.39 2. 31 49.35 44.08 
1963-64 2. 31 1.11 3.07 44.71 48.80 
1964-65 1.28 0.97 2.34 50.41 45.00 
1965-66 1.35 0.99 2.28 56. 11 39.27 
1966-67 1.94 1.22 2. 05 51.97 42.82 
1967-68 2.29 1.12 1.97 49.35 45.27 
1968-69 2.27 1.02 2.23 44.87 49.93 
1969-70 3.21 1.54 3.55 35.84 55.86 
1970-71 3.92 2. 06 4. 31 38.64 51.07 
1971-72 4. 34 1.20 4.11 42. 68 47.67 
1972-73 3.85 1.48 3.16 48.28 43.23 
1973-74 5.98 1.12 3.78 45.88 43.24 
1974-75 5.92 1. 31 3.98 45.18 43.61 
Source: National Income Account, NEDB. 
Table 1.2.4 shows the sugarcane contribution to GDP along with that 
of its competing crops from 1962-63 to 1974-75. It can be observed 
that its contribution increases quite substantially over the decade. 
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1-3 The Importance of Other Competing Crops 
1.3.1 Mungbean 
Mungbean is another important economic crop in Thailand. 
In 1970, the total planted area was 1.5 million rais, and production 
was 148,500 tonnes. Mungbean exports were 41,036 tonnes at a value 
of 124 million baht. In 1975, production increased to 270,000 tonnes, 
of which 53,149 tonnes were exported, the value of which was 265.2 
million bahts. 
Unlike sugarcane, mungbean can be processed into many 
products like transparent vermicelli, beansprout and other kinds of 
desserts. Furthermore, mungbean root can convert nitrogen in the air 
into fertilizer which helps to maintain fertility in the soil, thus 
saving the cost of fertilizer. 
Nakornsawan province in the central region is the most 
important province growing mungbean. Mungbean can be grown 3 times 
a year at the onset of the rainy season, at the end of the rainy 
season between August and September, and between January and February. 
It takes only 60-90 days to mature. Therefore, farmers can obtain 
returns more quickly from mungbean that from sugarcane. 
Mungbean's share in the GDP originating from crops is 
shown in Table 1.2.4. Unlike sugarcane, it shows a relatively 
constant share. 
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1.3.2 Cassava 
Cassava can be processed into flour, sago and other 
desserts, glue and alcohol. It can also be processed into animal 
feeds which are exported, earning foreign exchange. In 1974, the 
product of cassava which was exported was valued at 3,82 5 million 
bahts. Table 1.3.2.1 shows the value and percentage of cassava 
product exports from 1971 to 1975. 
TABLE 1.3.2.1 
VALUE OF CASSAVA PRODUCT EXPORTED 
Shredded Pellet Flour Total Yp = y* Value % Value % Value % Value 
1971 2,469 0. 20 974,992 79. 13 2 54,608 20. 67 1,232,069 100 
1972 2,150 0. 14 1,307,490 84. 60 235,943 15. 26 1,545,583 100 
1973 25,116 0. 99 2,109,872 83. 39 395,029 15. 62 2,530,017 100 
1974 143,580 3. 75 2,911,304 76. 11 770,272 20. 13 3,825,157 100 
1975* 118,399 3. 25 3,181,916 87. 43 339,218 9. 32 3,639,533 100 
Source: Department of Customs. 
* January-October figure. 
In 1974/75, Thailand was the sixth largest cassava pro-
ducer in the world market, producing 3.8 million tonnes. The largest 
producer in that year was Brazil, followed by Indonesia, Zaire, 
Nigeria and India. 
Table 1.2.4 shows the share of cassava in the GDP originating 
from crops. This share remained relatively stable from 1963 to 1975. 
14 
1.3.3 Maize 
Maize is increasingly an important export for Thailand. 
In 1971, the value of maize exported was 2,280 million bahts thus 
becoming the third most important export product of Thailand, behind 
rice and rubber. Maize is expected to become even more important, 
not only for export, but also for domestic consumption by livestock 
and luinianr.. In 1975, the ox|)ort value incroasod to 5,6.15 million 
bahts. 
Maize is basically an upland or dryland crop and the good 
months for planting it in Thailand are May and June of each year 
(i.e. at the onset of the rainy season) although some areas can be 
planted during October and November. 
Maize centres are in 34 provinces, most of which are in 
the Central region. The share of maize in the GDP originating from 
crops includes that of sorghum as they are calculated together. 
1.3.4 Rice 
Rice has been and will always be an important food crop 
in Thailand because it is a staple food. Table 1.2.4 shows its share 
in the GDP originating from crops from 1963 to 1975. Its share has 
been about one half of the total GDP originating from crops. 
Rice can be grown twice a year. There are many varieties 
that can be grown in Thailand and prices of rice vary accordingly. 
The majority of rice is grown in the central region where the land 
is a flat lowland suitable for growing. 
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Table 1.3.3.1 indicates the share in total export value 
of the 5 crops that were exported during 1962-1975. 
It can be observed that rice has declined in its relative 
importance. While the share of rice exported declined from 34.00 per 
cent in 1962 to 11.52 per cent in 1975 that of sugar increased signifi-
cantly from 1.54 per cent in 1962 to 12.76 per cent in 1975. The 
share of the other three crops did not vary significantly. 
TABLE 1.3.3.1 
THE SHARE OF THE FIVE CROPS AND THEIR PRODUCTS IN TOTAL EXPORT VALUE (%) 
Year Rice Cassava Mungbean Maize Sugar Others 
1962 34. 00 4.44 0.65 5.41 1.54 53.96 
1963 35. 38 4. 54 0.61 8. 80 1.42 49.25 
1964 35.57 5.29 0. 68 11.24 1.89 45. 33 
1965 33.49 5.22 0. 78 7.75 1.07 51.69 
1966 27.96 4.50 0. 56 11.01 0.77 55. 20 
1967 32.85 5.12 0.48 10.10 0.55 50.90 
1968 27.60 5.65 0. 56 12.68 0.12 53. 39 
1969 20.00 5.95 0.92 12.00 0. 54 60.59 
1970 17.04 8.28 0. 89 13.33 2.75 57.71 
1971 16.84 7.17 0. 78 13. 23 2.71 59.27 
1972 19. 73 6.88 0.64 9.28 6.03 57.44 
1973 11.15 7.87 0.65 9.21 4.60 66. 52 
1974 19.49 7.62 0.53 11.85 8.54 51.97 
1975 11.52 9.49 0.49 11.78 12.76 53.96 
Source: Agricultural Statistics of Thailand Crop Year 1975/76. 
Division of Agricultural Economics. Office of the Under-
Secretary of State, Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operative, 
Bangkok, Thailand, No. 54, 1976. 
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The index number of value of the five crops shows that 
sugarcane increased markedly after 1967. The second highest increase 
was for maize, followed by rice, cassava and mungbean respectively.^ 
As for the index number of price of the five crops in the 
same period (i.e. 1967-1975), maize shows the highest increase, closely 
6 followed by sugarcane, and then rice, mungbean and cassava. 
As for the index number of production of the five crops, 
sugarcane increased substantially over the same period, followed by 
7 cassava, maize, rice and mungbean. 
Table 1.3.3.2 shows clianges in areas planted to tlic five 
crops from 1962 to 1975. 
TABLE 1.3.3.2 
CHANGE IN AREA PLANTED TO THE FIVE CROPS 
(RAI) 
Year Maize Rice Mungbean Cassava Sugarcane 
1962/63 
1963/64 562 61 320 108 296 
1964/65 -837 -357 2 -219 82 
1965/66 156 89 121 -19 -131 
1966/67 479 5,493 97 177 -105 
1967/68 567 -4,84 2 -20 66 157 
1968/69 112 3,561 420 186 202 
1969/70 -515 2,227 47 127 -398 
1970/71 932 -560 196 210 123 
1971/72 1,188 203 -570 -19 3 
1972/73 -137 -1,112 361 709 268 
1973/74 941 6,339- 173 581 483 
1974/75 579 -2,381 -164 376 319 
1975/76 451 5,713 -271 28 509 
Source: Op. cit. 
5 Division of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Co-operative. 
6 Op. cit. 
7 Op. cit. 
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1.4 Specific Objectives of the Study 
There is little economic research which has been done on 
the production and supply response of sugarcane in Thailand. The 
problem under study here is how sugarcane area planted varies with 
relative gross return (i.e. price times yield) per rai when a changing 
structure and other economic variables are accounted for over the 
period 1968-1975. In addition, it is possible that the estimated 
supply functions may be used in formulating and recommending economic 
policy if the results obtained are adequate. The central hypothesis 
of the study is that Thai sugarcane fanners respond positively and 
rationally to changes in relative gross returns and other economic 
8 
variables, once the effects of a changing structure and environment 
are accounted for. 
1.5 Outline of the Study 
This study will focus attention on sugarcane production 
in the provinces which comprise the sugarcane growing centre, as 
listed earlier. Following this introductory chapter, supply studies 
and supply response models which have been applied to analyses of 
sugarcane in other countries, as well as supply response models on 
other crops in Thailand, are reviewed in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3, the way in which sugarcane price is deter-
mined is examined. An understanding of the quota system is necessary 
8 Here "structure and environment" means before and after the estab-
lishment of the sugarcane farmers' association; and before and 
after government intervention. 
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before a discussion on the price determination process. Other important 
aspects of sugarcane farmers and contracts other than price are also 
examined. 
Chapter 4 provides a review of some theoretical models of 
perennial crops supply response. By accumulating information from the 
previous four chapters, the general model of supply response of sugar-
cane farmers will be set up. 
Chapter 6 considered the availability and limitations of 
the data, the results of which lead to simplification and adjustment 
of the model stated in Chapter 5. Section 6 in this chapter reports 
the results obtained from the regression analyses. A summary of the 
results is reported. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, summary and conclusion will be 
made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The objective of this chapter is to firstly review some 
of the literature on supply estimation of sugarcane, and secondly 
to review that on supply estimation of other crops in Thailand. 
2.1 Supply Estimation of Sugarcane 
Most of the studies of supply estimation of sugarcane 
have been carried out in India. R. Krishna^ developed a model, based 
on the Nerlovian adjustment model. 
X* = a + b P _ + c Y _ + g Z + h W + u (1) "t t"" 1 "t 1 t i t t 
X, - = 6(X* - (2) 
where 
X * is the standard irrigated acreage that farmers plan to plant 
in the year t. 
is the standard irrigated acreage actually planted to the crop 
in the harvest year t; "standard irrigated" acreage of the crop 
means the irrigated acreage plus the un-irrigated acreage multi-
plied by a standardisation factor. 
is the relative price of the crop, i.e. the post harvest price 
of the crop deflated by an index of the post-harvest prices of 
the alternative crops. 
1 Krishna Raj, "Farm Supply Response in India-Pakistan: A Case Study 
of the Punjab Region", Economic Journal, Vol. 73 (September 1963), 
pp. 477-487. 
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Y is the relative yield of the crop, i.e. the yield of the crop 
deflated by an index of the yields of alternative crops. 
Z is the total irrigated area in all crops of the season. 
W is the rainfall. 
u is the error term. 
3 is the Nerlovian coefficient of "adjustment". 
The estimating equation resulting from the first two equations is: 
where: 
Krishna's study covered cotton, maize, sugarcane, rice, bajra, jowar, 
wheat, gram and barley over the period 1914-15 to 1945-46 (31 years). 
For sugarcane, the estimating equation was specified as: 
where: 
a. = a3, b = b3, b = cB, b^ = (1-3) and v^ = 
He felt that the acreage planted in the crop year t is 
influenced more by the post-harvest price of year t-2 than the post-
harvest price of year t-1, for the preparations for plantings of the 
year t begin even before the sugar season (December-March) of the 
immediately preceding harvest is over. 
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liis analysis shows that sugarcane has a positive short-
run price elasticity of 0.34. The long-run price elasticity is 0.60. 
In the determination of acreage, it is found that price alone was the 
important factor. Table 2.1.1 shows the acreage response function 
and Table 2.1.2 shows the adjustment coefficient and short and long-
run elasticities found by his study. 
TABLE 2.1.1 
ACREAGE RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR SUGARCANE (KRISHNA'S STUDY) 
Regression Coefficient p p 
0.72 1.45 0.44 0.44 
(0.49) (0.38) (0.20) 
(Figures in parentheses are the standard errors.) 
Source: R. Krishna, ibid. 
TABLE 2.1.2 
ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT AND SHORT- AND LONG-RUN 
ELASTICITIES FOR SUGARCANE (KRISHNA'S STUDY) 
. . Price Elasticities of Supply Serial 
Adjustment Coefficient Correlation 
Short-Run Long-Run 
0.56 
P 0.17 0.30 No t-1 
P _ 0.34 0.60 t 2 
Source: R. Krishna, ibid. 
22 
However, thia is a false interpretation of the price 
elasticity of supply. The reported results reproduced here in 
Table 2.1.2 make little sense and are open to ambiguous interpretation, 
A more meaningful interpretation is as follows. The estimated 
function was as follows: 
By progressive back substitution we obtain the final form of the 
equation: 
1-2 
Then the following supply price responses can be derived; 
= b = one year response 
= b + b b = second year response 3 2 4 
— — = b + = long-run response 3P 3 1-b^ 
By using this progressive back substitution it is found 
that the long-run elasticity is approximately 0.90 instead of 0.30 
and 0.60 reported by Krishna. 
The inclusion of P^ ^ as a variable in the estimating 
equation, even though Krishna initially hypothesized that fanners are 
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affected more by the post-harvest price of year t-2, reduces the 
validity of his findings. Furthermore, the relationship between 
acreage and prices in the previous two periods involves estimation 
problems when only one equation is used. Interdependence of prices 
from one time period to the next may result in multicolinearity 
between these two price variables and hence reduce the precision of 
the coefficient estimates. This can be overcome by the estimation of 
two separate equations regressing acreage firstly on price in period 
t-1 and then on price in period t-2, or combining the two variables 
to get a two year moving average. The coefficients for 
P _ will be different when estimated separately, the result of which t 2 
is different price elasticities both for the short-run and the long-run. 
Moreover, Krishna does not explain why the relative yield variable 
was dropped. 
2 
M.V. George (1965) , a research officer in Kerala University, 
Trivandrum, carried out a study to examine changes in the price structure 
and acreage in response to the price of various crops, viz. paddy, 
sugarcane, coconut, cashew nut, rubber and tapioca in Kerala State 
over the period 1952-53 to 1961-62 (10 years). 
He related the two-year average price of each commodity 
to two-year average prices of all other commodities as follows: 
(P.^ + P.^ ,)/2 X. = It it-1 1 m 
It Tt-l It lt-1 3 
2 M.V. George, "Impact of Relative Changes in Prices on the Cropping 
Pattern of Kerala", Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
Vol. 20, 1965, pp. 48-51. 
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where: 
X^ = relat ive price of crop i . 
^it-1 ^ Pr ices of crop i in period t and t-1 
P j ^ ' ^jt-1 ~ Pi^ices of competing crops in period t and t-1 
m = number of competing crops 
George c l a s s i f i e d crops into two non-competing groups, 
depending on the nature of land suitable for their cult ivat ion . 
He simply compared the index of relative change in price 
and area . Table 2 . 1 . 3 indicates changes in relative prices and acreage 
under selected crops over the period 1952-53 to 1961-62. 
TABLE 2 . 1 . 3 
CHANGES IN RELATIVE PRICES AND ACREAGE UNDER 
SELECTED CROPS (1952-53/1961-62 - GEORGE'S STUDY) 
No. Crop 
Index of Relative 
Price 
Change in 
Area 
1 Paddy 1 0 4 . 9 7 1 8 5 . 1 6 
Group A 2 Sugarcane 102 . 54 1 9 0 . 3 8 
3 Coconut 9 3 . 0 2 1 1 4 . 9 5 
1 Rubber 1 4 5 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 
Group B 2 Cashew nut 1 2 9 . 8 0 1 2 5 . 0 0 
3 Tapioca 5 4 . 0 0 5 2 . 0 0 • 
Source: M.G . George, i b i d . 
The table shows that there is a close correspondence between 
pr ice and acreage. It was found that there has been a slight shift from 
food crops to cash crops and that the acreage response to price has 
been positive for most crops. It is the relative increase in price 
and not the absolute increase which brings about an increase of 
acreage under a particular crop (i.e. similar findings to those of 
Krishna). George recommended a price policy which is designed to 
stabilise the relative prices of food crops in terms of the other 
agricultural commodities produced in the State and to maintain this 
stability by constant vigilance and supervision. 
The study did not concern itself with the period in 
between the two periods, i.e. between 1952-53 and 1960-61. He assumes 
that average acreage planted in the periods is determined by the 
average relative price in the same periods, which in fact is over-
simplifying reality. With some crops, acreage planted may be deter-
mined by the previous year's relative price (i.e. a lagged variable) 
and not by the contemporary price. 
K. Subbarao (1969)^, a lecturer in Economics in the 
University of Delhi, carried out a farm supply response study on 
sugarcane in Andhra Pradesh over the period 1952-53 to 1954-65 
(12 years). The hypothesis he was testing was whether there was 
any significant positive association between changes in relative 
acreage and output on the one hand and relative prices on the other. 
He used relative price and relative gross income per acre as a proxy 
for profitability. He regressed relative area, relative output and 
relative yield of sugarcane with its relative price. The results 
are indicated in Table 2.1.4. 
3 K. Subbarao, "Farm Supply Response - A Case Study of Sugarcane in 
Andhra Pradesh", Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 24, 
1969, pp. 84-88. 
TABLE 2.1.4 
RESULTS OBTAINED FROM SUBBARAO'S STUDY 
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Period of Study 
and Number of 
Observations 
Equation R 
1952-53 to 1964-65 A t 
(12 observations) 2 = 41.98+ 0.612* (0.274) P t-1 
0.33 
II 
III 
1953-54 to 1964-65 A t 
(11 observations) 2 A t 
1952-53 to 1964-65 A^t 
(12 observations) 2 A t 
74.24 + 0.535 - 0.204 -^ 
(0.300) P t-1 (0.34) P t-2 
N.S. N.S. 
-12.57+ 0.513t 
(0.247) P t-1 (0.316)A t-1 
0. 30 
0.53 
IV 1952-53 to 1964-65 O t (12 observations) = 80.72 + 0.4 29i-(0.28) P t-1 
0.20 
V 
VI 
1952-53 to 1964-65 Y t 
(12 observations) ^2^ 
1952-53 to 1964-65 A t 
(12 observations) 
= 86.50 - 0.116 P^t-i 
2 A t 
(0.126) P t-1 
N.S. 
P^t-1 + Y^t-1 -31.38 + 0.595* + 0.79+ 
(0.27) P t-1 (0.64) Y t-1 
0.08 
0.43 
VII 1952-53 to 1964-65 A t (12 observations) ^2^ -7.68 + 0.53* 0.58+ ^ ^ ^ (0.2i: 2 I t-1 (0.29) A t-1 
0.59 
VIII 
IX 
1952-53 to 1964-65 O t 
X 
(12 observations) 2 O t 
= 23.95 + 0.827 
1952-53 to 1964-65 O t 
(12 observations) ^2^ 
1952-53 to 1964-65 P^t 
(12 observations) ^2^ 
Y^t 
(0.66) Y t 
N.S. 
A t = 11.71 + 0.824* 
(0.134) A'^ t 
P^t-2 = 172.6 + 0.407t 0.96* 
(0.213) P t-1 (0.210)P t-2 
0.12 
0.78 
0.74 
(Column # = Serial No. of the Equation) 
Note: A O 2 ' 2 ' 2 ' 2 A P O Y 
, indicate, respectively, area, price, output 
and yield of sugarcane, relatively to its competing crop, rice. 
[contd. over) 
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indicates the aggregate gross relative income per acre of 
I sugarcane 
Subscripts t, t-1, etc., refer to the time period. 
* shows that the coefficient is significant at 1 per cent level. 
+ shows that the coefficient is significant at 5 per cent level, 
t shows that coefficient is significant at 10 per cent level 
N.S. means that the coefficient is not significant. 
Source: K. Subbarao, ibid. 
The explanation for the variation in relative acreage 
improved when lagged relative acreage was included (in equation III). 
Using gross income per acre rather than price as the profitability 
measure resulted in significantly better explanatory power (e.g. 
2 compare equations VI and VII with an R of 0.43 and 0.59 respectively). 
The inclusion of P ^ in the estimating equation accounted t ~ 2 
for the fact that the current year's acreage includes the previous 
year's ratoon, which therefore should respond to price lagged two years. 
However, the R is lower, his explanation being that the inclusion of 
P reduced the number of observations by one. t ~ 2 
Equation X in the table indicates that the current price 
is correlated with price in-the previous year • 
From his study, he found that changes in relative acreage 
under sugarcane in Andhra Pradesh are positively associated with 
changes in its relative price. However, relative gross return (income) 
per acre seems to explain better the changes in relative acreage. 
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Subbarao uses relative acreage instead of absolute acreage, 
but does not state the reason why he chooses to do so. He also went 
through a painstaking process of testing the predictive efficiency of 
various variables such as lagged relative prices, • 
means of an autoregression. He implicitly assumes that there is no 
difficulty of adjustment, i.e. the level of acreage desired by farmers 
is fulfilled (desired acreage equals actual acreage). He applied the 
Nerlovian Expectation Model, which he did not explicitly spell out, in 
equations III and VII. This could be either the partial adjustment or 
the Adaptive Price Expectations Model. 
Even though Subbarao could not do anything to solve the 
ratoon problem, he realized the existence of the problem, resulting 
2 
in the low value of R obtained in his study, and stated that this 
can be overcome when there is data on the new planting area and ratoon 
area every year. 
4 
Another study was done by Dayanatha Jha (1970) on the 
acreage response of sugarcane in the factory area of North Bihar over 
the period 1912-13 to 1964-65 (52 years). The aim of the study was 
to investigate the impact of relative price and some non-price vari-
ables on sugarcane acreage, and to study changes in the nature and 
magnitude of the relationship between variables over time. He separated 
the analysis into three time series to examine changes over time, i.e. 
from 1912-13 to 1964-65, from 1933-34 to 1964-65, and from 1950-51 to 
1964-65. He also regressed from 1912-13 to 1932-33, 1933-34 to 1949-50 
and 1950-51 to 1964-65 for a more precise picture of those changes. 
4 Dayanatha Jha, "Acreage Response of Sugarcane in Factory Areas of 
North Bihar", Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 25, 1 m n TQ_Q1 1970, pp. 79-91. 
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He adopted the Nerlovian Adjustment Lag M o d e l which is expressed as: 
^t = ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^ V t " V t ^^^ 
whe re: 
A* = long-run equilibrium acreage under sugarcane (in thousand 
acres) in year t. 
= price of sugarcane (and gur) relative to the price of 
competing crop (wheat) in the preceding period (post-harvest) 
= yield of sugarcane p e r acre in the preceding period. 
C^ = area under competing crop in period t. 
W^ = rainfall during pre-sowing months (October-February) in 
the period t (in inches). 
T^ = time trend 
D^ = a dummy variable to pick up the effect of change in the 
method of estimation of acreage in 1949-50. 
Table 2.1.5 indicates the estimated linear acreage response 
function for sugarcane in different time periods and Table 2.1.6 indi-
cates some additional functions containing significant variables. 
Table 2.1.7 shows additional response functions for analysis 
of changes in relationships over time and Table 2.1.8 indicates esti-
mates of Elasticities obtained for different time periods. 
The important finding from this study was that it was not 
u n t i l 1932-33 that prices seem to have a significant positive influence. 
Before that time p e r i o d , acreage under other grain crops was the main 
determinant. Both sugarcane and gur relative prices, exert an identical 
influence though the former exhibits a trend of being an important 
explanatory variable only recently. The non-price variables such as 
lagged yield and pre-sowing rainfall have become significant only recently. 
TABLE 2.1.5 
ESTIMATED LINEAR ACREAGE RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR 
SUGARCANE IN DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Regression Coefficients 
Time 
Period 
Relative 
Price Constant 
Relative 
Price 
in t-1 
Cane Yield 
per 
Acre 
in t-1 
Cane 
Acreage 
in t-1 
Wheat 
Acreage 
in t 
Rainfall 
(October 
February) 
in t 
Trend Dummy 
Coefficient 
of Multiple 
Deter-
mination 
1 
Pt-1 Yt-1 At-1 Ct Wt Tt Dt R2 
1912 -13 to Relative 103. 5560 50.7662*** -0.9319 0.5879*** -0. 2791** 1. 6512 1. 8051** 29. 4000 0. 8878*** 
1964 -65 gur price (19.0733) (2.1533) (0.1225) (0. 1367) (1. 7035) (0. 7612) (22. 5818) 
1933 -34 to 125. 6156 81.7155*** 2.5131 0.3174*** -0. 0427 3. 2487* -1. 8313 57. 0903** 0. 6551*** 
1964' -65 (20.8422) (2.3227) (0.1452) (0. 1500) (1. 8300) (1. 1384) (25. 2131) 
1950' -51 to 378. 5931 209.4967** 5.9281 0.9757 -0. 064 2 6. 1335** -13 .0929* 0. 7354** 
1964' -65 (87.5043) (3.9711) (0.3927) (0. 2128) (2. 5324) (6. 3158) 
1933--34 to Relative 128. 9455 1066.3629*** 3.5042 0.2104*** -0. 0729 3. 0359* -1. 6934 61. 2573** 0. 7156*** 
1964--65 cane price (218.8431) (2.0666) (0.1300) (0. 1353) (1. 6409) (1. 0168) (22. 9695) 
1950--51 to 287. 7389 2180.6220*** 7.2190* 0.1683*** 0. 0137 5. 2982** -7. 5456** 0. 8372*** 
1964--65 (576.4052) (3.1645) (0.1916) (0. 1679) (1. 9488) (3. 0348) 
* 
* * 
* * * 
Significant at 10 per cent 
Significant at 5 per cent 
Significant at 1 per cent 
The null hypothesis for the coefficient of lagged acreage is that it is 
equal to one. Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Source: Dayanatha Jha, ibid. 
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TABLE 2.1.6 
SOME ADDITIONAL RESPONSE FUNCTIONS CONTAINING SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES 
Regression Coefficients 
Time 
Period 
Relative 
Price Constant 
Relative 
Price 
in t-1 
Cane Yield 
per 
Acre 
in t-1 
Cane 
Acreage 
in t-1 
Wheat 
Acreage 
in t 
Rainfall 
(October 
February) 
in t 
Trend Dummy 
Coefficient 
of Multiple 
Deter-
mination 
Pt-1 Yt-1 ^t-1 Ct W+ D+ 
1912-13 to Relative 97. 8180 46. 6940** 0. 5566*** -0. 2605* 2. 0643*** 23. 2193 0. 8854*** 
1964-65 gur price (18. 2029) (0. 1122) (0. 1338) (0. 7066) (21. 2435) 
1933-34 to 107. 3094 88. 7272*** 0. 4083*** 3. 7692** -1. 9420* 53. 1753** 0. 6340*** 
1964-65 (19. 7954) (0. 1216) (1. 7041) (1. 1125) (19. 1468) 
1950-51 to 221. 7091 162. 0804* 0. 8960 6. 0880** -7. 6661 0. 6517** 
1964-65 (84. 3345) (0. 3984) (2. 5811) (5. 3824) 
1933-34 to Relative 101. 2725 1072. 8925*** 3. 7868* 0. 2083*** 2. 8555* -1. 7615* 53. 2354*** 0. 7121*** 
1964-65 cane price (215. 3773) (1. 9700) (0. 1281) (1. 5827) (0. 9945) (17. 2163) 
1950-51 to 293. 0399 2175. 5995*** 7. 1659** 0. 1708*** 5. 3155** -7. 5067** 0. 8370*** 
1964-65 (540. 6698) (2. 9213) (0. 1786) (1. 8270) (2. 8272) 
* 
* * 
* * * 
Significant at 10 per cent 
Significant at 5 per cent 
Significant at 1 per cent 
The null hypothesis for the coefficient of lagged acreage is that it is 
equal to one. Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
TABLE 2.1.7 
ADDITIONAL RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN RELATIONSHIPS OVER TIiME 
Regression Coefficients 
Time 
Period 
Relative 
Price 
Cane Yield Wheat Rainfall Coefficient Relative per 
Acre 
Cane (October Trend of Multiple Constant Price Acreage Acreage February) Deter-in t-1 in t-1 in t-1 in t in t mination 
Short run 
Elasticity 
with 
Respect 
to Price 
Pt-1 Yt-1 At-1 Ct Wt Tt 
1912--13 to Relative 273.0684 -1.9282 -4.7433 0. 0098*** -0.3181** -1.3629 2.1646*** 0. 7171*** Negative 
1932--33 gur price (17.9722) (3.8717) (0. 2748) (0.1338) (1.3479) (0.5684) 
1933--34 to 161.6906 74.4834*** 1.3313 0. 0673*** 0.1310 -1.0449 -2.04 96 0. 7207** 0. 2607 
1949--50 (20.5427) (4.3393) (0. 1562) (0.1122) (2.4386) (1.4618) 
1950--51 to 378.5931 209.4967** 5.9281 0. 9757 -0.0642 6.1335** • -13.0929* 0. 7354** 0. 6390 
1964--65 (87.5043) (3.9711) (0. 3927) (0.2128) (2.5324) (6.3158) 
1933--34 to Relative 180.3223 763.04 54** 1.0917 0. 0923*** 0.0925 -0.8418 -2.3721 0. 6630** 0. 2765 
1949--50 cane price (253.7703) (4.7623) (0. 1726) (0.1212) (2.7453) (1.6103) 
1950--51 to 287.7389 2180.6220*** 7.2190* 0. 1683*** 0.0137 5.2982** -7.5456** 0. 8372*** 0. 6585 
1964--65 (576.4052) (3.1645) (0. ,1916) (0.1679) (1.9488) (3.0348) 
Test of significance of difference between coefficients for different time periods: 't' values 
Gur 13--33 Vs. 34-50 2.7971*** 1.0445 0. ,1819 2.5722** 0.1142 2.6869** 
Gur 13--33 Vs. 51-65 2.3666** 1.9241* 2. ,0152* 1.0099 2.6131** 2.4061** 
Gur 34--50 Vs. 51-65 1.7338* 0.7395 4. ,2036*** 0.8576 3.0763*** ^ 1.9682* 
Cane 34--50 Vs. 51-65 2.2720** 1.0671 0. ,2981 0.3990 1.8177 1.5230 
* Significant at 10 per cent ** Significant at 5 per cent *** Significant at 1 per cent 
The null hypothesis for the coefficient of lagged acreage is that it is equal to one. Note: Figures in parentheses 
are standard errors. 
Source: For Tables 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 - Dayanatha Jha, ibid. 
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TABLE 2.1.8 
ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES OBTAINED FOR DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Time Period and 
Price Variable Used 
Relative gur price 
1912-13^to 1964-65 
1933-34 to 1964-65 
1950-51 to 1964-65 
Relative sugarcane price 
1933-34 to 1964-65 
1950-51 to 1964-65 
Elasticity with 
Respect to Price 
Elasticity with 
Respect to 
Short Run Long Run Yield Rainfall 
0.2257*** 
0.2710*** 
0.6390** 
0.3508*** 
0.6585*** 
0.5477 
0.3970 
18.6297 
0.4443 
0.7917 
-0.0464 
0.0998 
0.2324 
0.1391* 
0.2830* 
0.0343 
0.0559* 
0.0963* 
0.0522* 
0.0832* 
Coefficient 
of 
Adjustment 
0.4121 
0.6826 
0.0243 
0.7896 
0.8317 
* Significant at 10 per cent 
** Significant at 5 per cent 
*** Significant at 1 per cent 
@ Calculated as (1-r)'^  = 0.05, where r is the coefficient of adjustment and n is the number of 
years required to enable 95 per cent of change in price to materialise. 
Source: Dayanatha Jha, ibid. 
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The short-run elasticities over the period 1933-34 to 
1954-65 do not differ significantly from those estimated by Krishna. 
But others do exhibit significant differences. "A high coefficient 
of adjustment implies in Nerlovian terms, a general lack of rigidities 
which inhibit attainment of equilibrium output."^ This means that 
there is little institutional limitation on the response of sugarcane 
farmers to changes in the relative sugarcane price. 
This study found a long-run inelastic supply of sugarcane, 
the reason for which seems to be the limited land resources and high 
premium placed on growing food crops which have priority in acreage 
until the food requirement of the population is reached. 
Note that his study assumes partial adjustment and naive 
price expectations. Jha treats sugarcane as the annual crop and thus 
fails to consider the ratoon as an important determinant on farmers' 
decisions. However, he does carry out a very extensive study, including 
many explanatory variables and many years of observations. Although 
not stated, the data was presumably fairly accurate. 
The inclusion of wheat acreage as an explanatory variable 
was justified only because of the priority that the Government gave 
to growing w h e a t . A large number of observations allowed this 
extensive study. 
M . C . Madhavan^ (1972) carried out a study on acreage 
response of Indian farmers in Tamil Nadu and made an acreage response 
5 Dayanatha Jha, ibid., p . 89. 
6 M.C. Madhavan, "Acreage Response of Indian Farmers: A Case Study of 
Tamil Nadu", Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 27, 1972, 
pp. 67-84. 
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analysis with respect to relative price, yield per acre and rainfall 
for four major cereal crops, viz. rice, sorghum, Ragi and Cumbu; and 
for four major commercial crops, viz. sugarcane, groundnut, cotton 
and gingelly. 
His model began by identifying a production function 
which led to the desired demand function for the cultivation of the 
crop under study, expressed as: 
P i ^ ^ rs 
log X. = a + a log — + a log E. + a log E. + a log X. + u. (1) 1 l p ^ 2 i 3 j 3 ^ 
where: 
/N 
X^ = desired acreage of crop i 
P. 1 ratio of expected price of crop i with respect to crop j 
E^ = planned yield per acre of crop i 
Ej = planned yield per acre of crop j 
Xj = desired acreage of crop j 
He added the coefficient of adjustment such that: 
^it-1 
(2) 
Before he decided to use a one-year lag, Madhavan ran tests on a one-
year lag, a two-year lag, a two-year moving average, and a three-year 
2 
moving average. The one with the one-year lag yielded the highest R 
value. Therefore, assuming a one-year lag, substituting equation (2) 
into equation (1) and solving it for ^^^t we have: 
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P . 
log X. ^  = b^ b^ log ^ + b^ log E + b3 log E + b^ log X 
. b^ log + v.^ (3) 
where: 
where: 
p. 
^^  = relative price of crop i with respect to crop j, lagged 
jt-1 one year 
= yield per acre of crop i, lagged one year 
= yield per acre of crop j, lagged one year 
X^^ ^ = acreage of competing crop, lagged one year 
X.^ ^ = acreage of cropi, lagged one year 
The weather variable is incorporated into the equation 
only when it is deemed important in farmers' decision-making. It is 
assumed that the farmers' decision-making process consists of two 
stages. In the first stage, with the knowledge of the variables 
specified in equation (3), he would make his tentative decision 
towards the end of May as to what crop or crops to cultivate in the 
next season to get maximum net income. The weather variable should 
then be relevant to the second stage when weather will be an important 
factor influencing his final decision. 
Equation (3) is a log-linear function, which differs from 
other models. Another difference is in the denomination of the price 
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variable. Other models noted above used the weighted average of the 
prices of all competing crops as the denominator, while in this model 
the lagged relative price variable refers to only one competing crop. 
A further difference is that Madhavan did not use relative yield. 
However, he real izes that his model could be reduced to have a yield 
ratio if he assumes the substitution parameters of crops i £md j to 
be equal. Unsupported by any reason he stated that, ceteris paribus, 
an expected increase in yield per acre of a dependent crop (or an 
expected decrease in the yield per acre of a competing crop) would 
make the production of the dependent crop desirable. Thus, he 
expected the coefficient of yield elasticity b^ to have a positive 
sign, and the coefficient of cross yield elasticities b^ to have a 
negative sign. This, in my opinion, is not necessarily true. For, 
in some cases where farmers have a certain level of production in mind 
and where they expect a higher yield, they may reduce the acreage 
planted to the crop, and vice versa. However, this argument is 
invalid if farmers are profit maximisers. Also, if this is the case, 
we would expect the coefficient on both P^ and P^ to be positive. 
The point is one of a consistent approach to relative price and yield 
as they affect relative profits. 
Table 2.1.9 indicates regression coefficients. It can 
be seen from the table that_the coefficient of (i.e. yield of 
competing crop) does not have the expected megative sign. However it 
is felt that with the exception of the groundnut coefficient the rice 
and the Ragi coefficients will not be statistically significant. By 
not imposing a homogeneity constraint on the yield variables, he loses 
one degree of freedom. 
TABLE 2.1.9 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
Crop Competing Crop P t-1 ^it-1 ^jt-1 ^jt-1 W V-1 R R 
Sugarcane Rice 0. 62 0. ,44 1. 32 1. 48 -0. 35 0. ,88 0. 85 
(0. 18) (0. ,88) (0. 73) (1. ,23) (0. ,20) 
1 Ragi 0. 52 1. .70 0. 58 1. , 14 -0. 20 0. 57 0. .58 0. 43 
(0. 34) (1. .30) (1. 04) (2. 25) (0. ,40) (0. 34) 
Groundnut 0. 63 1. .27 1. ,86 0. .57 -0. 35 0. 17 0. .85 0. 75 
(0. ,25) (0. .80) (0. .60) (0. .53) (0. ,23) (0. 27) 
Source: M.C. Madhavan, ibid. 
CO 
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Table 2.1.10 indicates estimated short run and long run 
acreage elasticities of sugarcane. In the table the coefficient of 
adj ustinent (B) , when rice is the competing crop, should be 1.00 
instead of 0.94. It seems that sugarcane responds more to the relative 
rice price than to the price of Ragi or groundnut (because its 3 is 
equal to 1). The high price response and quick adjustment could be 
attributed to the general behaviour of the large land owners who pro-
duce mainly for the market; these groups of farmers are better equipped 
t 
with market information and their better education enables the adaptation 
of new techniques and new technology in growing sugarcane. 
Madhavan's study contradicts itself because the inclusion 
of competing crop acreage (e.g. rice) is justified only when priority 
is given to grow rice first. However, his explanation of why the cross 
yield coefficient is positive is in contrast with this fact. He 
explained that the positive relationship between sugarcane acreage 
and cross yield is due to the cropping pattern associated with sugar-
cane cultivation. At the time of making a choice between sugarcane 
and, say, rice, they are competing crops. But once the choice is made 
to cultivate sugarcane in the first year, rice becomes a complementary 
crop. 
Furthermore, Madhavan's model involves a simultaneous 
equation bias. This means that OLS parameter estimates are biased. 
Most of the studies reviewed here assume a naive price 
expectation, even though some experimented with several price 
formulations. They applied the Nerlovian Adjustment Model without 
trying to consider that it is suitable for an annual crop but not 
TABLE 2.1.10 
ESTIMATED SHORT- AND LONG-RUN ACREAGE ELASTICITIES OF SUGARCANE 
Short-Run Elasticities of Coefficient Long-Run Elasticities of 
Acreage with Respect of Acreage with Respect 
Crop ^ to Adjustment to Crop 
Pt-1 Eit-1 Ejt-1 Xjt-1 Wt B Pt-1 Eit-1 Ejt-1 Xjt-1 
Commercial 
Group 
1 
Sugarcane Rice 0.62 0.44 1.32 1.48 -0. 35 0. 94 0.66 0.47 1.40 1. 57 -0.37 
Ragi 0. 52 1.70 0.58 1.14 -0.20 0.43 1.21 3.95 1.35 2.65 -0.47 
Groundnut 0.63 1.27 1.86 0.57 -0.35 0.83 0.76 1.53 2. 24 0.69 -0.42 
Source: M.C. Madhavan, ibid. 
o 
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for a ratoon crop such as sugarcane. In other words, they do not 
present any theoretical background for a ratoon crop. A good econo-
metric model should represent reality as closely as possible but 
obviously they ignored this important consideration. As a result, 
the coefficients estimated and therefore elasticities may be subject 
to specification errors. Policy recommendation based on these results 
may be detrimental to the economy. Therefore, a careful analysis 
should be made before deciding to use these results as a guide to 
policy recommendation and policy implementation. 
2.2 Application to Thailand 
Very few empirical studies have been done on agricultural 
supply functions in Thailand. Two major studies are: 
(1) "Supply Response in Underdeveloped Agriculture: A Case Study 
of Four Major Annual Crops in Thailand, 1937-1963", by Behrman, J.R., 
1968. North-Holland Publishing Company. 
(2) Chaiwat Konjing, "Demand and Supply of Rice in Thailand", Staff 
Paper No. 3, Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Economics 
and Business Administration, Kasetsart University, December 1970. 
Behrman's model is the Expectations-Adjustment Model. 
(b) \ = -21 ^  V l ^ ^ 22 - ^ ^ ' f 
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where 
d 
A ^ = the desired area planted to the crop of concern 
A^ = the actual area planted to the crop of concern 
e 
P = the expected normal farmers' price of the crop of concern 
t 
relative to alternative crops 
P^ = the actual farmers' price of the crop of concern relative 
to alternative crops 
D^ = a dummy variable representing the transportation charges 
which alter the Bangkok-Up-Country price differential 
Q 
Y^ == the expected yield of the crop 
Y ^ = the actual yield 
N^ = the farm population in the geographical area under study 
M = the annual malaria death rate per 100,000 occupants in the 
area, per se. 
t = a time trend 
u = a disturbance term for the i^^ relationship, 
it 
In estimating equation (a), he defined two new variables. These are: 
sP = the standard deviation of the relative price of the crop over 
^ the last three preceding production periods 
sY = the standard deviation of actual yields of the crop over the 
^ last three preceding production periods 
The variables sP, sY are proxies for the farmers' sub-
jective assessment of the uncertainty element in future prices and 
yields, i.e. replace P^ and Y^ in equation (a) above by sP and sY 
respectively. The coefficients of these two determinants were assumed 
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on a priori grounds to be negative. But the values of the short-run 
elasticities of supply with respect to sP^ and sY^ do not support the 
hypothesis of a preference for avoiding risks. 
Table 2.2.1 indicates coefficients of multiple correlation 
and supply elasticities for rice in Thailand. 
TABLE 2.2.1 
COEFFICIENTS OF MULTIPLE CORRELATION AND SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 
FOR RICE IN THAILAND, 1937-63 
Range Median Mean^ 
I. Coefficient of multiple correlation 0.03 to 0.96 0.73 0.70 
2 
II. Estimated short-run elasticity of 
area planted in rice at point of ^ 
means for 1940-63 with respect to: 
1. Expected relative price of rice ^^^^ ^^ q_20 0.25 
(P*) 
2. Expected relative yield of rice ^_^^ ^^^^ 
(Y*) 
3. Standard deviation in price over ^^^^ ^^ _^g ^^^^ 
last 3 years (SP^) 
4. Standard deviation in yield over q.00 to -0.31 0.00 -0.03 
last 3 years (SY^) 
5. Population residing in agricul- ^^^^ ^^ 
tural households (N^) 
Notes: 1 Each of the 50 provinces was given an equal weight in 
calculating the mean value. 
2 The short-run is defined to be one crop-year. 
3 The difference in the two time periods, 1937-63 and 
1940-63 is due to the inclusion of SP^ and SY^ which 
were measured over three years. 
Source: J.R. Behrman, "Supply Response in Undeveloped Agriculture; 
A Case Study of Four Major Annual Crops in Thailand, 1937-
1963", North-Holland Publishing Company. 
44 
TABLE 2.2.2 
COEFFICIENTS OF MULTIPLE CORRELATION AND SUPPLY ELASTICITIES FOR 
CASSAVA, MAIZE AND KENAF IN THAILAND, 1950-63 
Range Median Mean 
I. Coefficient of Multiple Correlation 
Cassava 0. 23 to 0.90 0. 57 0. 57 
Maize 0. 73 to 0.96 0. 84 0. 84 
Kenaf 0. 73 to 0.99 0. 86 0. 85 
Estimated Short-Run Elasticity of 
Area Planted (at Point of Means) 
with Respect to: 
1. Expected relative price (P*) 
Cassava 0. 00 to 1.09 0. 55 0. 55 
Maize 0. 00 to 4.47 0. 14 1. 03 
Kenaf 0. 88 to 5.50 2. 51 2. 70 
2. Expected relative yield (Y*) 
Cassava 0. 00 to 0.60 0. 30 0. 30 
Maize 1. 36 to 7.73 3. 06 3. 56 
Kenaf 0. 00 to 3. 71 0. 00 1. 05 
3. Standard deviation in price 
over last 3 years (SP^) 
Cassava -0. 46 to -0.50 -0. 48 -0. 48 
Maize 0. 00 to -1. 69 -0. 26 -0. 44 
Kenaf 0. 00 to -3.63 -0. 19 -0. 70 
4. Standard deviation in yield 
over last 3 years (SY^) 
Cassava 0. 00 to -0.09 -0. 05 -0. 05 
Maize 0. 00 to -0.35 0. ,00 -0. 07 
Kenaf 0. 00 to -1. 28 -0. 33 -0. 46 
5. Annual malaria death ..rate per 
100,000 inhabitants (M^) 
Cassava 0. 00 to 0. 00 0. .00 0. ,00 
Maize 0. 00 to -12.27 0. ,00 -1, .67 
Kenaf 0. ,00 to -1.39 -0. ,28 -0, .46 
Source: J.R. Behrman, "Supply Response in Undeveloped Agriculture; 
A Case Study of Four Major Annual Crops in Thailand, 1937-1963", 
North-Holland Publishing Company. 
Table 2.2.2 indicates coefficients of multiple correlation 
and supply elasticities for cassava, maize and kenaf in Thailand. 
On the whole, maize, cassava and kenaf have higher multiple 
correlation coefficients than those obtained for rice. The short-run 
price elasticities of the three upland crops are also higher, especially 
in the case of kenaf. However, the three upland crops exhibit more risk 
aversion than rice. 
Chaiwat used ordinary least squares to estimate the supply 
of rice. The period under study was from 1952 to 1966. His supply 
function was: 
log = a^^ b^^ log + b^3 log 4- b^3 log u^^ 
where 
Y3 = annual production of rice (on paddy basis) in kilograms 
per capita 
Y^ = annual wholesale price of paddy (no. 1) in baht/tonne 
deflated by the wholesale price index (1958 = 100) 
X3 = trend, 1952 = 1, 1953 = 2, etc. 
X^ = annual harvested rice area (rai) per capita 
u^^ = disturbance tertn 
The R^ obtained was fairly low (0.12). The coefficients were all 
statistically insignificant. This can be, among other things, due to 
unreliability of the data which can lead to a dependence between the 
error term and the explanatory variable(s) thus violating the underlying 
assumptions of the O.L.S. method. A further complication is that of the 
possible collinearity between pairs of the explanatory variables resulting 
in multicollinearity.^ 
7 Chu, K., "Principles of Econometrics", International Textbook Company, 
1968, pp. 102-122. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF SUGARCANE AND THE 
DETERMINANTS OF SUGARCANE PRICE 
Before the establisliment of the sugarcane farmers' associa-
tion, the sugarcane price was determined solely by sugar factories in 
the regions. The sugar factories usually have many tricks to depress 
the cane price paid to farmers. For example, before the production 
season starts the factories would try to get all of the sugar stocks 
out for sale to depress the sugar price. In doing so, they can tell 
farmers that they cannot afford to pay a higher price for sugarcane. 
Since the establishment of the sugarcane growers' association in 1955 
it has been a two-way bargaining process. In 1976 the Government 
stepped in to set the price at 300 bahts per tonne of sugarcane because 
both parties could not agree upon a price. This chapter, therefore, 
will touch on certain aspects of cane farmers, the cane farmers' 
association, sugar factories, and price determination. 
3.1 Cane Farmers 
Table 3.1.1 indicates the number of farmers and average 
rai per farmers in the four regions in 1973/74 and 1975/76. 
Table 3.1.2 indicates the distribution of farms by size 
(%), belonging to the sugarcane farmers' association in the Central 
Region. Out of 6,000 members of the association, 12 per cent hold 
less than 25 rai and 23 per cent of the members have 25-100 rai. The 
majority of farmers, i.e. 47 per cent, use 100-500 rai to grow 
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sugarcane. Only 18 per cent of the 6,000 members have greater than 
500 rai. The majority of sugarcane farmers in the region belong to 
the sugarcane farmers' association.^ 
TABLE 3.1.1 
NUMBER OF SUGARCANE FARMERS AND NUMBER OF 
RAI PER FARM (AVERAGE) IN 1973/74 AND 1975/76 
Central 
Region 
Eastern 
Region 
Northern 
Region 
North-Eastern 
Region 
Year Average ^ Average ^ Average ,, ^ Averagi No. of . ^ No. of . No. of . ^ No. of Rai per Rai per Rai per „ Rai pe: Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Rarm Farm Farm Farm 
1973/74 18,673 
1975/76 23,920 
55.14 1,831 192.30 12,126 
59.10 3,151 144.43 17,012 
11.86 2,893 31.38 
18.00 4,800 36.06 
Source: Sugar Institute, Ministry of Industry. 
TABLE 3.1.2 
SIZE OF MEMBER FARMS OF THE CANE GROWERS' 
ASSOCIATION IN THE CENTRAL REGION (1976)* 
Size Percentage of Farmers 
Less than 25 rai 12 
25-100 rai 23 
100-500 rai 47 
Greater than 500 rai 18 
Total: 100 
*Source: The Sugarcane Farmers' Association of the Seventh Part. 
There are very few farmers who do not belong to any association 
especially those who sell cane straight to the Government factories 
in Supanburi province. Also, those farmers who borrow money from 
the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC) do 
not belong to the Sugarcane Farmers' Association. 
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3.2 Quota System 
The sugar factories refuse to buy less than a certain 
minimum requirement of sugarcane and this leads to the existence of 
the quota system. If the managers make separate transaction contracts 
with all of the small farmers, then the greater will be the number of 
contractors, and the higher the book-keeping and contract making costs. 
Furthermore, the arrangement of the queue for sugarcane delivery will 
be very difficult with so many small contracted farmers. The minimum 
requirement of sugarcane for a quota is not necessarily the same for 
each factory. Sugar mills with larger production capacity would set 
a higher level on the minimum requirement than the smaller ones. 
Normally, in the Central Region, the minimum requirement is 2,000 tonnes. 
Quotamen, usually rich sugarcane farmers, act as middlemen 
gathering sugarcane from smaller farmers for their contracted sugar 
mill manager. The farmers are charged 10 bahts per tonne as the con-
tract commission from their cane money. Besides the service mentioned 
above, the quotamen also provide other services like loans to their 
contracted farmers for planting sugarcane, for precautionary spending, 
and so on at a 20 per cent rate of interest (or greater). Other 
services like selling fertilizer, herbicide and rice, etc. on credit 
are also given by quotamen. Tractors for ploughing and trucks for 
2 Knowing the average farm size and yield per rai (approximately 
8 tonnes per rai), we can calculate how many farmers a quotaman 
needs to contract to meet the minimum requirement of 2000 tonnes. 
If the quotaman deals with farmers with 100 rai of sugarcane, 
he will have a transaction with only 2 to 3 farmers. 
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transportation of sugarcane to the factories are also provided on 
credit. The quotamen also obtain labourers for the contracted 
farmers. 
Each individual quotaman does not contract the entire 
aunount of sugarcane under his control with only one sugar mill. This 
is to minimize the risk of a shut down of his contracted mills for 
repairs and also when faced with an unexpected increase in the demand 
on his processing facilities resulting from different rates of arrival 
known as the queueing behaviour. 
Small farmers claim that they are being exploited by 
quotamen. When they join in under any quotaman's quota, they bear 
some risk of transaction. By "risk of transaction", it is meant 
that farmers dealing with any quotamen, with no literal contracts 
between them, claim that they are not sure of the amount they can 
actually sell through the quotaman. The only contract between them 
is in borrowing money. Because the majority of the quotamen are 
large-scaled sugarcane farmers themselves, in the year of good cropping 
they cheat the farmers under their quota by not bringing all of the 
sugarcane from their farms to sugar mills. The quotaman's own cane 
will be transported first to the mill and then he will transport the 
small farmers' sugarcane later. The amount may be just enough to cover 
the debt created from borrowing money from the quotamen. Farmers 
claim also that they are being cheated in the weighing of sugarcane 
because they do not follow it to the sugar mills at the time when the 
quotamen bring their cane to be sold at the sugar mills. Farmers, 
then, have to accept whatever the quotamen say about the quality and 
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the weights of their sugarcane. Moreover, the quotaman receives 
the cane money from the sugar mills manager twice a month during the 
production season, while paying the whole amount of sugarcane money 
to the farmers at the end of each sugar production season. This gives 
the quotamen time and opportunity to invest the money. However, there 
is no strong evidence about this malpractice. 
The BAAC together with the Sugar Institute established a 
Credit Project in Kanchanaburi in 1970, charging farmers a 12 per cent 
rate of interest. This enabled farmers to reduce their production cost. 
Furthermore, small farmers can sell their products to a sugar mill 
through the quota of BAAC, thus bearing a smaller risk of transaction 
than under any quotamen. It is required that small farmers group 
together under a farmer who acts as the head of the group and who 
takes responsibility to pay back the loans and interest. The BAAC 
also provides an opportunity for them to get tractors for ploughing 
their farms and trucks for transporting their cane to the sugar mill. 
But this project has not been progressing very well because it only 
benefits the middle-class farmers who have lands or property required 
by the bank to be used as collateral in borrowing money from the bank. 
Besides, the BAAC does not provide loans for consumption, etc. But 
farmers can borrow money from quotamen for purposes other than 
planting sugarcane. Therefore, most of the farmers in Kanchanaburi 
province still remain under the quotaman's control. 
Table 3.2.1 shows the number of sugarcane farmers who 
borrowed money from the BAAC in Kanchanaburi. 
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TABLE 3.2.1 
NUMBER OF SUGARCANE'FARMERS WHO BORROWED 
MONEY FROM THE BAAC IN KANCHANABURl 
Year Total Sugarcane Farmers^ No. of Clients of BAAC^ Percentage 
1970 5,041 56 1.11 
1971 4,111 150 3.65 
1972 6,010 234 3.89 
1973 6,576 585 8.90 
Source: 1 Sugar Institute, Ministry of Industry. 
2 BAAC, Ministry of Finance. 
Even though the quotaman plays a very important role, he 
does not directly influence the decision-making of the farmers. The 
farmers themselves have a choice about which crops, and how much of 
each crop to plant. 
Quotamen activities do, however, seem to influence returns 
to sugarcane farmers. The potential effects of institutional changes 
on returns from sugar production and hence also of supply response 
behaviour should be built into the model specification. 
3.3 Determinants of Sugarcane Price 
Before the establishment of the sugarcane farmers' associa-
tion, price was determined by purchasers. The sellers were price-
takers and had no bargaining power over the price because the sugar 
factories were the sole buyers of the sugarcane and also because 
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the nature of sugarcane means that it can easily lose its sucrose 
content thus losing some of its quality, resulting in a lower price 
to the farmers. 
The price set by the factories was, therefore, low 
depending on how low the price of sugar was just before the beginning 
of the production season. The price of sugar was usually low before 
tlie production season due to the various tricks employed by the 
factories to depress the sugar price as has already been mentioned. 
Later, when the sugarcane farmers' associations were 
established in Kanchanaburi (Central Region) in 1964 and in Chonburi 
(Eastern Region) in 1969, the price was determined by the bargaining 
process between sugar factories and the cane association. In 1976, 
the Government stepped in to control the sugarcane price at 3 00 baht 
per tonne. 
The following section will deal in some detail with some 
aspects of the sugarcane farmers' association, sugar factories and 
the Government, which together determine the sugarcane price. 
3.3.1 Sugarcane Farmers' Association 
The first association was established in 1964. Its main 
objective was to bargain over the price of sugarcane. Later, the 
objectives were extended to the improvement of transport facilities 
and public facilities. It also provides some welfare assistance to 
members. 
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The sugarcane farmers' association can bargain for a 
sugarcane price against the sugar mills because they have control 
over the sugarcane supply. Table 3.3.1.1 indicates the price of 
sugarcane from 1961/62 to 1974/75 in each region. 
TABLE 3.3.1.1 
YEARLY AVERAGE SUGARCANE PRICE (AT FACTORY LEVEL) IN EACH 
REGION FROM 1961/62 TO 1974/7 5 
Year 
North 
Region 
Central- Eastern^ North-Eastern 
1961/62 120. 68 126. 43 125. 78 100. 00 
1962/63 121. 44 126. 78 128. 12 102. 84 
1963/64 116. 49 155. 80 169. 69 154. 24 
1964/65 118. 67 125. 51 124. 72 112. 92 
Average 119. .32 133. ,63 137. 08 117. 50 
1965/66 92. ,87 105. .63 100. 82 96. 41 
1966/67 114. , 68 169. .68 158. 65 128. 16 
1967/68 118. ,01 204. .89 223. 63 158. 68 
1968/69 126. .59 157. .01 150. 63 122. 10 
Average 113. ,04 159. .30 158. 43 126. 34 
1969/70 130, .37 135, . 09 140. .92 123. 97 
1970/71 126. .32 145. .87 146. . 30 130. 09 
1971/72 131, .91 149, . 75 156. ,95 133. 04 
1972/73 155, .08 -182, . 36 182. ,98 138. ,76 
1973/74 177 .79 203 .61 200. . 79 168. ,74 
1974/75 292, .39 300 .65 300. .70 276. .32 
Average 168 .98 186 .22 188, .14 161. ,82 
1 Sugarcane farmers' association established in 1964. 
2 Sugarcane farmers' association established in 1969. 
Source: Sugar Institute, Ministry of Industry. 
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There is no sugarcane farmers' association in the Northern, 
nor in the North-Eastern Regions. It can be clearly observed that the 
sugarcane price in the two regions is lower than the Central and 
Eastern Regions. By comparing the two average prices of Central and 
Northern Regions from 1961/62 to 1964/65 and 1965/65 to 1968/69 (which 
is the period after the establishment of the sugarcane farmers' associ-
ation in the Central Region), the difference in the average price 
between the two regions during the first period was 14.31 baht per 
tonne while that of the second period was 46.62 baht per tonne. After 
the establishment of the sugarcane farmers' association in 1965, the 
four year average price (1965/66 to 1968/69) increased 19.21 per cent 
from the previous four years (1961/62 to 1964/65). For the Eastern 
Region, after 1969 when the association was established, the average 
price increase over the six year period was 18.75 per cent. However, 
the rate of increase in price in the Northern and North-Eastern Regions 
was higher than the Central and Eastern Regions when comparing the two 
periods between 1965/66 to 1968/69 and 1969/70 to 1974/75 (i.e. 49 per 
cent for the Northern Region and 28 per cent for the North-Eastern 
Region). 
Nevertheless, when looking at the absolute price level, 
prices in the Central and the Eastern Regions have always been higher 
than in the Northern and the North-Eastern Regions. This is true even 
before the establishment of the sugarcane farmers' association. This 
may be because of more oligopsonistic power exerted by sugar factories 
in the latter two regions. This will be dealt with in more detail 
later in Section 3.3.2. 
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To be a itieinber of the association sugarcane farmers pay a 
subscription fee of 2 baht per tonne of sugarcane sold to the factory. 
Under the association regulations, some portion of the 2 baht will 
be spent on the association administration, and a portion will be spent 
to improve the public utilities used by the general sugarcane farmers, 
e.g. to improve roads to facilitate sugarcane transportation, for 
scholarships for poor but intelligent children of the sugarcane farmers 
and for building hospitals in the sugarcane districts. 
However, these associations were formed by quotamen, not 
by the general sugarcane farmers. The wealthy quotamen are on the 
operating committee and most of the members are quotamen. It is 
generally believed that quotamen benefit from the operation of the 
association. Bargaining for a higher price is of more benefit to 
quotamen than to the farmers because the quotamen have much more 
cane of their own than each farmer. The higher the price the asso-
ciation can bargain for, the more benefit it gets. Everyone in the 
district can enjoy a better transportation from constructing the 
roads, but the quotamen can get more benefits because this enables 
them to reduce the sugarcane transportation cost. 
One of the objectives of the association is to create 
unity among sugarcane farmers which has not been well achieved. 
Whenever there is a conflict between sugarcane farmers and quotamen, 
the association will try to achieve a compromise but in the end, 
quotamen gain instead of farmers rightfully receiving the benefit. 
For example, in the production year 1973/74, the sugar mills increased 
the sugarcane price by 20 baht per tonne. This amount should have 
been paid to the farmers because quotamen already receive a commission 
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of 10 baht por tonne. However, the association settled on a compromise 
to share the additional price between quotamen and their contracted 
farmers. This example is just one of the conflicts between quotamen 
and farmers whicli still occur every now and then. 
Furthermore, the associations do not provide agricultural 
knowledge to their members. Nor do they provide cheap credit or the 
supply of fertilizer and insecticides. This may be because these 
services will obstruct the quotamen"s profit and benefits. 
3.3.2 Sugar Factories 
The plantation white sugar mills were first established 
in Thailand in the 1860s. Before that sugarcane was used as an important 
material in making muscovado. Therefore, when the sugar mills first 
purchased cane from farmers, they had to compete with the cottage 
muscovado mill owners. The sugar mills advanced money to sugarcane 
farmers who agreed to make a forward contract with them. This money 
was called "sugarcane promotion money" which, in a way, was a loan to 
farmers who had no capital to spend on growing sugarcane. This sugar-
cane promotion money is still used but is given to each farmer in 
different amounts at a fixed rate depending on the weight of cane to 
be transacted, e.g. at the rate of 10 baht per tonne. A farmer who 
contracted to supply 1,000 tonnes of sugarcane receives 10,000 baht 
while those who contracted 2,000 tonnes receive 20,000 baht. 
With many small farmers, the transaction cost is high, 
e . g . the cost of book-keeping and difficulties in arranging the queue 
of sugarcane delivery. To eliminate these problems, they set up a 
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minimum sugarcane requirement, which varies from factory to factory. 
Thus the importance of quotamen. Contract bonuses are used as an 
incentive by the sugar mill to ensure that the quotamen will try to 
deliver the contracted amount. Those farmers who could not supply 
sugarcane to them at the contracted amount would not only not receive 
this money, but would also have deducted from their sugarcane money 
an amount to cover the shortage of sugarcane in tonnes. However, in 
the case of crop failure or burnt sugarcane, the factories cannot 
impose this penalty upon the contracted farmers. 
Before the establishment of the sugarcane fainners' associa-
tion, sugar factories were the only authority measuring the weights 
of sugarcane sold by the farmers. Farmers complained that this enabled 
the factories to cheat them. However, the establishment of the asso-
ciation gave this measuring service to the farmers. The weight 
measured by both authorities has to be the same or must have only a 
marginal difference. 
The managers of sugar factories and sugarcane farmers 
make forward transaction contracts with each other in June. The 
farmers have just planted tlieir sugarcane at that time, so that the 
amount of sugarcane supply for the coming production season is not 
yet known exactly. The sugar production season in Thailand starts 
in November of every year, so that there is a five months gap between 
the- time the forward transaction contracts are made and the time of 
starting the new sugar production season. During this time, the sugar 
market situation in the world market can change. The manager would 
bear the risk of this uncertainty if prices had been fixed previously. 
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In order Lo avoid this risk, the sugar mill managers have to set the 
sugarcane price at the time the new sugar production season starts. 
At that time, both the sugar market and the sugarcane market conditions 
will be known more exactly. 
However, the farmers would not want to know the sugarcane 
pricc too late. It was decidcd, then, to bargain for the price one 
monlih prior to bho starting of the new production season. 
In 1975/76 the number of sugar factories in each region was: 
Central Region : 20 
Eastern Region : 9 
Northern Region : 8 
North-Eastern Region : 4 
By making a comparison of price data in Table 3.3.1.1, 
I have observed that the larger the number of factories, the higher 
the price of cane paid to the farmers (as in the case of the Central 
and Eastern Regions). The smaller the number of factories, the lower 
the price of cane (as in the case of the North-Eastern Region). In 
the North-Eastern Region many small farmers produce sugarcane but there 
are very few factories to sell to. The factories have a relatively 
large control over the farmers. But in the Central Region, where 
there are more factories, cane farmers and quotamen have the opportu-
nity to make a contract with many alternative factories and hence 
oligopsonistic power is less in the Central and Eastern Regions. 
As for the Northern Region, where there are eight sugar factories, 
prices are not markedly different from those in the Eastern Region. 
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'iMio ninry i na 1. cli.CCorence in pcico iiuiy bo due to the exiEJtonce of 
sugarcane farmers' associations in the Eastern Region.^ 
Furthermore, the rate of growth in the number of factories 
in the Northern Region is lower than that in the Eastern Region as can 
be observed from the fact that the first modern sugar factory was 
established in the Northern Region in 1938, long before those in the 
Eastern Region. However, the number of factories in the Northern 
Region was one less than the Eastern Region in 1975/76. Tliis, there-
fore, implies that in the Northern Region before 1975/76, as there 
were fewer sugar factories, oligopsonistic power may have been in 
existence. This may explain the differences in price between the two 
regions. 
Moreover, factory capacity is greater in the Eastern 
Region than in the Northern Region. The factories in the Eastern 
Region require more sugarcane thus bidding the price up. The quantity 
of sugarcane processed annually in the Eastern Region has always been 
greater than in the Northern Region. For example, in 1974/75 pro-
duction season the quantity of sugarcane processed in the Eastern 
Region was 3,340,490 tonnes, while that in the Northern Region was 
1,615,061 tonnes. 
Another reason may be that the labour cost is lower in 
the North and the North-Eastern Regions than in the other two regions 
because more labourers are available. This is especially true for 
3 Inability to know the details on type of soil and its fertility 
make it impossible to investigate whether the difference in price 
is due to the quality difference. 
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the Nor tli-Eastcrn Region because quotamen in the Central and Eastern 
Regions, where there are shortages of labour, obtain labour from the 
North-Eastern Region for fanners in the Central and Eastern Regions 
for a cor La in coiiunission. WiLh more labour available in the NorLh 
and the Nortli-Eastern Regions, the cost of production is reduced, the 
consequence of which may be the apparent lower price. Furthermore, 
in the North-Eastern Region some sugar factories also have their own 
sugarcane farms which, even though they might not be able to produce 
all the sugarcane required, might be another factor which reduces the 
sugarcane price. 
The factories operate only between November and June. They 
stop operating before the onset of the rain because sugarcane in the 
rainy season has a very low sugar content but a very high weight. 
Farmers, therefore, have to cut and deliver their sugarcane to the 
factories before the rainy season arrives. 
3.3.3 Government 
The Thai Government controlled the sugarcane price of every 
region in Thailand during the years 1961 to 1965 to aid the sugar 
factories and to stimulate the export of sugar. This is an integral 
part of the "Sugar Industry Aid Fund" Scheme. The Government stopped 
controlling the sugarcane price in 1965 when the sugar market was 
very bad and the Government had to abolish the Sugar Industry Aid 
Fund because the money to support the fund ran out. Since then price 
has been negotiated between the sugarcane farmers' association and 
the sugar factories. But during the production season 1974/75, a 
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saLisfacLory noyoLiation was not made. The Govermnenl: thoroEoro had 
to step in and decide on 300 baht per tonne. This controlled price 
is still in effect. However, some factories still pay less than 
300 balit per tonne bocause of their olicjopsonistic power and bocausc 
of quotainen activities. Some factories pay more than 300 baht per 
tonne because of the application of the C-C.S. system (Commercial 
Cane Sugar) which measures the sugar content and the price is set 
accordingly. Only a few factories are using this method. 
Besides controlling the sugarcane price, the Government 
has control over three important areas: the distribution of sugar 
within the country, the calculation of the domestic requirement for 
sugar, and the domestic sugar price. In December 1974, the Cabinet 
created the Sugar Production Control and Distribution Centre. Its 
function is to administer domestic sugar sales by producers and to 
watch over and regulate producer stocks. 
The Centre's main activity is to calculate the quantity 
of sugar which should be released into the domestic market at any 
time and to issue each sugar company with a weekly release figure. 
The basic quantity for each company is 1/52 of its annual production 
quota for white sugar, minus 20 per cent for stocks. This quantity 
can be varied as demand changes. Sugar companies are permitted to 
release white sugar to domestic buyers until their weekly release 
quota is reached. 
As an additional mechanism to control domestic distribu-
tion, the sugar companies may sell white sugar only when the buyer 
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has a release certificate issued by the Sugar Centre. The release 
certificates generally are supplied only to wholesalers or to major 
consumers. 
The Centre has encountered operational difficulties as a 
result of the refusal of some producers, including the Government 
sugar factories, to co-operate with its program. The Government is 
having trouble convincing the dissidents to co-operate, which is 
destroying any confidence that might have existed in the Centre's 
attempts to regulate distribution. The future of the Sugar Centre 
is not certain at present. 
As for the calculation of the Domestic Requirement, the 
Thai Government policy is to give first priority for sugar supplies 
to the domestic market, leaving the residual amount available for 
export. Before the start of each milling season, the Government cal-
culates expected domestic demand for the year, adds an amount for 
stocks, then subtracts this sum from total expected production for 
the season, determining the amount available for export. 
As well as guaranteeing adequate supplies of white sugar 
to the domestic market, the Thai Government controls domestic sugar 
prices. The controlled wholesale price of white sugar in March 1975 
was 4.00 baht per kilogram and the retail price was 4.50 baht per 
kilogram. 
These controlled prices are set by the Centre on behalf 
of the Cabinet. Theoretically speaking, these prices should be deter-
mined with a view to the maintenance of adequate sugar supplies in 
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the domestic market. In practice, however, retail prices usually lie 
above these controlled levels. 
The production and price controls applied to white sugar 
have led to irregularities in distribution. The most obvious is 
extensive smuggling which has reduced supplies to the domestic market 
and helped raise retail prices above their controlled levels. Another 
irregular practice is a "buy back" system which involves the sugar 
producers releasing their prescribed quantities of white sugar to 
wholesalers, then buying it back in order to inflate their white 
sugar stocks and therefore the millers are able to produce an equally 
greater quantity of raw sugar for export. 
In summary, the present price determination is made as a 
result of price bargaining between representatives of all sugarcane 
farmers'associations and the representatives of all private sugar 
mills in the same area. Government officers from the Ministry of 
Industry act as arbitrators. However, if they cannot agree upon the 
final sugarcane price, the Government officers will try to reach a 
compromise. If the officers do not succeed in doing so, they make a 
final decision on the price as a last resort (as happened in 1974/75). 
As for the North and North-Eastern Regions, where there 
are no sugarcane farmers' associations, the sugar factories still 
play a very dominant role in deciding the price of sugarcane although 
their importance is diminishing due to intervention by the Government. 
While writing this thesis, the establishment of a sugarcane farmers' 
association in the Northern Region is under way. Even though the 
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price is set by the Government at 300 baht per tonne, sugar factories 
in these two regions actually pay less than that amount. 
The sugarcane price determination contract will be made in 
the conference room of the Ministry of Industry about October or 
November. It consists of four important parts: 
(1) Sugarcane Price Determination. This contains the items that have 
to be deducted from the agreed sugarcane price, e.g. the subscription 
paid to the sugarcane farmers' association. Contract guarantee money 
(or contract bonus) is also deducted from the sugarcane money in order 
to pay quotamen after that production period is over (in certain pro-
vinces only). 
(2) Agreements on the sugarcane money payments. Sugar mills in every 
region make two payments a month. The dates of payment are indicated 
in the contract. The money is paid 50 per cent in cash and the 
remainder in post-dated cheques. 
(3) The Agreement on the quality of transacted sugarcane which will 
affect the price. This agreement is intended to prevent conflicts 
between the sellers and the mills on the quality judgement of trans-
acted sugarcane and the sugarcane price deduction. 
(4) The Agreement between sugar mills and the Ministry of Industry 
on the quantity of raw sugar to be produced by each factory in order 
to ensure sufficient production for domestic consumption of white 
sugar. 
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3.4 Farm Price 
Sugarcane fanners do not actually receive the full amount 
paid by the sugar factories. Certain deductions are made, e.g. sub-
scription fee of the sugarcane farmers' association, quotamen commission, 
interest on loans borrowed from quotamen, labour costs, etc. 
Table 3.4.1 indicates the farm price of sugarcane in the four regions 
from 19G7 to 1976. 
TABLE 3.4.1 
FARM PRICE OF SUGARCANE FROM 
1967 TO 1974 (BAHT/TONNE) 
Year 
Region 
North North-East Eastern and Central 
1967 93.41 80.89 153.55 
1968 95.13 96.54 -
1969 99.92 112.55 115.64 
1970 111.23 102.41 111.80 
1971 105.84 100.16 144.76 
1972 100.28 105.00 138.06 
1973 94.90 115.12 192.25 
1974 193.00 155.00 193.00 
Source: Division of 
Agriculture 
Agricultural Economics, 
and Cooperative. 
, Ministry of 
The Eastern Region is combined with the Central Region. 
The reason for this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 in the 
data and adjustment section. 
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3 . 5 OLlior Contracts 
Besides the price determination contracts, the sugarcane 
forward transaction contract is also important. This contract is 
written by each sugar mill and is composed of three parts: 
(1) Agreement on Transacted Cane which consists of an agreement on 
the quantity and quality of transacted sugarcane. The sugar factories 
have two methods of enforcing the quantity contracted. They are: 
(a) Proventivo Control Method. The managers investi-
gate the seller thoroughly before making the contract with him. 
They look into the seller's record on his ability to supply 
sugarcane for the mill in the past production year. Other 
aspocts are also examined, e.g. the quality of sugarcane 
supplied by the seller, etc. 
(b) Penalty Control Method. The mill either cuts down 
next production year's contract quota or imposes the contract 
guarantee money which is determined at a fixed rate per tonne 
on the amount of sugarcane the seller cannot deliver. 
In practice, the quantity delivered can fluctuate by 
20 per cent around the contracted amount. 
4 . . 
The standard quality of sugarcane is 10 C.C.S and if it 
is below that level, the price will be lower. Other conditions 
4 C.C.S means Commercial Cane Sugar which is the system of payment 
by quality of the sucrose content. 
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affectiiiy price are maturity, dryness or freshness and the presence 
of other mixtures such as soil or leaves. Burnt sugarcane is only 
accepted at a lower price while sugarcane cut with too much of the top 
part is not acceptable. 
(2) Agreement on Sugarcane Promotion Money. This states that the 
sellers who accept the loans must spend all the borrowed money on 
planting sugarcane otherwise the loans will be stopped. Conditions 
for the loan are also stated, e.g. collateral, date of payments of 
loans, etc. 
(3) A further Agreement is that on the delivery date of the sugarcane 
to sugar factories which also states how many trucks per day or per 
interval of time are allowed depending on the contracted amount. 
Another important agreement concerns the obligation on the sugar 
factories to purchase all the contracted amount unless there are 
unforeseen circumstances like machine breakdowns, strikes, floods, 
fire, etc. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SUPPLY RESPONSE FUNCTION: A THEORETICAL SURVEY 
OF SUPPLY RESPONSE FOR PERENNIAL CROPS 
Sugarcane is, of course, not an annual crop but a short-
term perennial crop, whose life in Thailand is three years, beyond 
which time the yield drops dramatically. Consequently, two ratoon 
crops are grown in most regions. However, three ratoon crops are common 
in Kampaengphet which is in the Northern Region where soils and rain-
fall are particularly suited to cane production. The second ratoon 
crop usually gives the highest sugar content. Therefore, once a 
farmer decides to grow sugarcane, he is - generally speaking - committed 
to it for three years. The supply estimate studies reviewed in Chapter 2 
treated sugarcane as an annual crop. Their results, therefore, may not 
be accurate. This section thus reviews the general supply models for 
perennial crops. 
Bateman's Model^ 
Bateman studied the supply response of cocoa farmers in 
Ghana. He expresses acreage planted (X^) as a function of the average 
expected future real producer price of cocoa (P^) and the average 
expected future real producer price of the competing crop, i.e. coffee 
(C^). That is. 
1 M.J. Bateman, "Aggregate and Regional S\:pply Functions for Ghanian 
Cocoa", Journal of Farm Economics, May, 1965. 
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and 
n 
E + Y)^ 
P = t n + 1 
n 
^ + y)^ 
i=0 
^t ~ n + 1 
where: 
P*^^ = the expected real producer price of cocoa in year t+i 
C*^^ = the expected real producer price of coffee in year t+i 
Y = the fanner's subjective rate of discount 
n = the life span of the perennial crop 
The Nerlovian price expectation model is assumed, i.e. 
P - P : : = 3 ( p - p ) where 0 <1 3 < 1 t t-1 t t-1 
C^ - - " ^t-1^ where 0 < Y < 1 
and P^ and C^ are actual prices of cocoa and coffee respectively 
in year t. 
By assuming B and y to have the same value, the following 
is obtained: 
\ = + + a^BC^ + (1-3) X^., + v^  
where v^ = u^ - (1-3) \ ' ^ 
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This model assumes that yield and cost do not change 
significantly during the period under consideration, i.e. price 
fluctuates more than costs and yields. 
Thus the major determinant of expected profits is the 
expected price stream. If the farmer expects future prices to be 
higher than past prices, expected profits will increase and the incen-
tive to invest will induce more planting. On the other hand, if the 
farmer expects lower future prices and that the average prico level 
will be low relative to past prices, gross investment in this product 
will fall. 
However, the model does not consider the removal from 
the stock of trees and thus could overstate the net change in stock. 
2 The Ady Model 
Ady adds the existing stock of trees in the previous year 
as another important determinant of the area planted. That is: 
where 
P* = the expected price of cocoa in the year t 
A^ ^ = the acreage under cocoa in the year t-1 
X^ = the difference between A^ and 
A further difference is in the formulation of price expecta-
tion which is: 
2 P. Ady, "Trend in Cocoa Production", Bulletin of the Oxford University 
Institute of Economics and Statistics, December, 1949. 
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p* = - 0 < 3 < 1 
where W and P are the world prices of cocoa and coffee respectively. 
Instead of using domestic prices, he uses world prices. Thus, the 
model becomes: 
Behrman Model^ 
The model is an improvement on the previous two models in 
that is uses farmer's intended acreage instead of the actual acreage 
planted because the latter may not reflect the constraint imposed by 
institutional and technological factors on the farmer's decision. 
The model is such that: 
where 
X* = the desired acreage in cocoa trees in year t 
P* = expected price of cocoa 
C* = expected price of coffee 
He applies Nerlovian adjustment and expectation hypotheses. 
Thus: 
3 J-R- Behrman, "Monopolistic Cocoa Pricing", American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. August, 1958. 
72 
\ - V i = ^ - V i ^ V 
^^ - = ^30 - V l ^ ^ V 
He assumes that 3 in (3) and (4) have the same value. By 
combining (1), (2), (3) and (4) he obtains: 
where: 
% = - ^ 
b^ = (2 - 8 + B) 
b^ = (1 - d) (1 + 3) 
b3 = a^^ 3 3 
Even though the model reflects the constraints imposed by 
institutional and technological factors, it creates serious estimation 
problems in that it is not possible to separate the influence of the 
price expectation coefficients (3) and the output adjustment coefficient 
(3) . Frequently the inclusion of both ^nd as explanatory 
variables introduces severe multicollinearity problems. 
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4 The French and Matthews Model 
Besides being the model which explicitly recognises the 
constraints imposed on the fanner in adjusting his stock of trees, it 
also formulates the framework within which new plantings and acreage 
adjustments are determined. The model explains not only the planting 
but also the removal and replacement of plants. It considers explicitly 
the lags between input and output and the effect of population of 
bearing plants of production. Perfect competition and similar pro-
duction functions among farmers are assumed in this model. 
The model involves five major components: 
(I) A pair of functions that explain the quantity of production and 
bearing acreage desired by growers: 
= e^-i K - * ^ 2 ' C - " "it 
where: 
Q* = desired production for year t 
Q® = Y® A = expected average production with acreage at 
t-1 t-1 t-1 actual level of t-1 
n^ = expected long-run profitability per unit for the commodity 
^ of concern with production of 
n* = normal long-run (equilibrium) profitability per unit of t product for the commodity of concern 
n^ = conditional expected profitability per unit of product 
^^ for the alternative land use 
n* = normal long-run profitability per unit of product for the At alternative land use 
4 B.C. French and Matthews, J.L., "A Supply Response Model for Perennial 
Crops", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, August, 1971. 
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u^^ = a disturbance term 
Since the desired acreage is used as the dependent 
variable, equation (.1) is transformed into: 
A* = — — A^ + — (II! - 11*) + — (II!, - 11* ) + — (2) t yG t-1 ^e t t ^e At At ^e 
G Q where b > 0; b = k < 0, and n and IT are determined independently. 1 i 12 t ZVt 
simplification of equation (2) leads to: 
where AY® = Y^ ' -
If yield expectations remain constant equations (2) and (3) are identical 
and if it is assumed further that II® = 11* and then 
(II) A new planting function defined by the adjustments that would 
shift acreage toward the desired level. Thus, given A*, we have: 
N* = A* , - A + Rf^ - ^ (4) t t+k t-1 kt kt-1 
N^ < 0 
where 
N*^ = acreage of new plantings desired by growers in year t 
k = the gestation period in years 
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G R^^ = the total amount of acreage expected to be removed during 
the next k years including year t 
k 
= E = the total acreage planted after year t - k - 1 
i=l 
(III) A removal equation to explain the acreage removed each year. 
Q 
R^^ in equation (4) is composed of two parts. The first is the acreage 
of non-bearing and young and middle-aged bearing plants which have to 
be removed because of disease or damage by insects. The second is 
the acreage of older plants which are to be removed because of rapidly 
declining productive capacity. The former is assumed to be propor-
tional to the amount of bearing and non-bearing acreage. The latter 
is likely to be highly correlated with the acreage of plants which 
are older than the age at which productivity starts to decline signi-
ficantly (A°). Then: 
(5) 
\ t = ^31 \ - l " ^ \ - l - " ^3t 
where 0 <1 b < 1 and b is a very small proportion. X ^ 
(IV) Relationships between"'unobservable expectation variables and 
observable variables. Firstly, they believe that actual plantings 
(N^) may differ from desired plantings (N*) because of institutional 
or technological rigidities and managerial mistakes. By assuming 
that there is no residual effect of unobtained past desired planting, 
the relationship is: 
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N^ = aN* + e^ 0 < a < 1 (6) 
Therefore, by combining equations (4), (5) and (6), one obtains: 
where: 
52 22 
^ 
^ " ^ 2 
Secondly, actual acreage removed (R^) is believed to be determined by 
at least three factors - namely: 
(a) Institutional and physical factors such as urban expansion, 
a heavy freeze, or flood; 
(b) Short-run profit expectations for the next year. If it is 
expected that,for the coming year, it is going to be high then some 
removals might be deferred, and vice versa; and 
(c) Random factors which cause deviation between producer 
intentions and actions like a sudden shortage of fertilizer. 
Thus: 
64 t 65 t 6t 
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where: 
R^ = acreage removed at the end of year t 
o 
t^ A = acreage over the age when productivity starts to decline sharply 
rS n^ = short-run profit expectation per unit of product held 
in year t for year t+1 
3 
= short-run profit expectations per unit of product held 
in year t for the alternative land use in year t+1 
n*, n* = long-run normal profitability per unit of product and 
per unit of alternative crop in year t respectively 
Z^ = variable to reflect institutional or physical factors 
A^ = bearing acreage in year t 
u^ = disturbance term 5t 
The following function which shows the total change in 
bearing acreage from the year t-1 to the year t is presented as: 
\ - \ - l ^ ^^  - - \ - l " ^It 
when v^^ accounts for minor random variations such as disease losses. 
Substituting equations (1) and (8) into (9), we obtain: 
\ - = >^ 70 ^  >^71 '"t-k - ^ '"L-k - "Jt-k' 
+ ^ 7 - "Jt-l' " "78 " "79 \t-k-l 
4 - K A + b A + u (10) ^ ^^ 710 t-k-1 711 t-1 7t 
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where: 
= -^60 
= 
74 
75 
76 
32' 52 
= '^ 53 
= -b 61 
= -b 62 
b 77 
78 
= -b 63 
= -b 64 
S o = '^ -''32' '=55 
=710 = 
>=711= A 5 
S t - '^-"32' V - k + V - 1 + "it 
Equation (10) indicates that the change in bearing acreage 
of a perennial crop from year t-1 to year t is determined by unit profit 
and yield expectations held in year t-k (where k is gestation period), 
by the acreage of "old age" plants in year t-k-1 and t-1 (multiplied 
by old age acreage in t-1) , by institutional factors or physical 
factors, by the amount of non-bearing acreage as of t-k-1, by the total 
bearing acreage in t-1 and t-k-1, and by a random disturbance. 
Yet equation (10) still constitutes seven expectation 
variables and the hypothesis relating the expectations to observable 
variables are given below. 
(a) For yield: 
AY = f(Y ^ ,, Y ) ..., v t nt-1 nt-2 2t 
(11) 
when Y refers to yields of plants at a mature bearing age. n 
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(b) For normal long-run profitability: 
"At = ^At ^ -9t 
where C is average cost. As this model assumes perfect competition, 
long-run equilibrium profit is therefore zero, i.e. the difference 
between price (P) and average cost (C) is zero. 
(c) For expected profitability: 
= \t-2 
where L^ is a variable representing institutional factors. 
(d) For short-run profit expectations: 
S G G n® and n can be determined in a similar manner as II and 11 . t At r AC 
Thus, by substituting these functions into equation (10) we obtain an 
estimating equation in observable variables. 
(V) An equation that explains variation in the values of average 
yields, viz.: 
H 
Y = S a.A.^ + b^, T + (16) t . , 1 It 71 5t i=k 
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where: 
^it " acreage of the age in year t 
k = the initial bearing age 
H = a reasonable maximum age of the plant 
T = time 
v^^ = a disturbance term 
The importance of this model is that it reflects the nature 
of perennial crops, i.e. it explains not only the planting process but 
also the removal and replacement of plants. 
The Desired Stock Model 
Instead of using desired acreage as the dependent variable, 
the desired stock of trees is used. The model is: 
T* = c^ -f c^P^ + c^C + u^ 
where 
T* = desired stock of trees in year t 
P^ = expected price 
C^ = expected price of the competing crop(s) 
Applying the Nerlovian adjustment and expectation hypo-
thesis, the final equation becomes something like the Behrman Model 
mentioned earlier, viz equation (1), except that stocks of trees is 
used instead of acreage. 
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The Liquidity Model 
This model treats farmer's income as an important deter-
minant of new plantings. This is particularly true in developing 
countries where farmers' incomes are very low. However, in the case 
of sugarcane farmers, loans can be arranged from the quotaman with 
certain rates of interest. With the Bateman Model, adding the 
farmer's income in the previous year, i.e. Y^ gives: 
X, - a^ a^P* + a^C*^ t a3 u^ (1) 
Even though the price expectation is large, if the income 
situation is not in a favourable condition the investment in that crop 
will be smaller. 
If the price expectation (Nerlovian) hypothesis is assumed 
then equation (1) becomes: 
where v = u - (1-3) u . t t t ~ J_ 
Finally, it should be mentioned here that all models presented above 
assume symmetry of response to price changes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THEORETICAL SUPPLY RESPONSE MODEL OF SUGARCANE 
5.1 Introduction 
Of the six theoretical models of perennial crop mentioned 
in Chapter 4, I feel that the French and Matthews Model reflects the 
true nature of the perennial crop more adequately than the other models. 
However, the model is far too sophisticated and too complicated to be 
applied to sugarcane for the following reasons: 
(1) Sugarcane is cut down after three years of planting, 
and thus the removals decision can be treated as given by plantings 
three years earlier. 
(2) Sugarcane planted in that year can be harvested in 
the same year. Therefore, there is no gestation period. 
(3) Consequently, the concept of bearing/non-bearing 
acreage cannot be applied here. 
(4) The acreage removed is always the acreage planted in 
year t-3 or more generally, that acreage planted three years earlier, 
except in Kampaengphet in the Northern Region. There may be some 
acreage removed because the plants are destroyed by flood, drought or 
fire but there are no data available on these damaged plants. 
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5 . 2 A l'r.i or.i l'',u;LorB Af-Coct i ncj Llupp.l y of Siucjarcano 
The information on sugarcane, and other competing crops 
commented upon in the first three chapters enables us to hypothesize 
a priori that nine factors influence the supply of sugarcane. They 
are as follows: 
(1) Output price. Farmers' decisions on the production 
of sugarcane and other competing crops are influenced by the respective 
prices that they expect to prevail after the harvest. Expected price 
of sugarcane is usually compared with the expected price of the most 
profitable competing crop in any one year. Competing crops differ 
from region to region. Since sugarcane is an upland crop, other upland 
crops, i.e. cassava, maize and mungbean are the main competing crops. 
However, rice is a special case in the Central Region because some 
provinces in the Central Region (mainly Supanburi province) used to be 
rice-growing areas. Later, when sugarcane growing was found to be 
more profitable, farmers switched to sugarcane. Therefore, in the 
Central Region it is decided that rice, maize and cassava are the 
three important competing crops. In the Eastern Region, competing crops 
are maize, mungbean, and cassava while for the Northern and North-Eastern 
Regions, they are cassava and mungbean. 
(2) Stock of sugarcane. Stocks of sugarcane affect the 
farmers' decisions on new plantings in year t. In reality a farmer 
decides on the total area that he desires to have under sugarcane, 
given a certain expected price, and adjusts the new planting in year t 
to the stock of planted sugarcane so as to acquire the desired total 
area planted to sugarcane. 
84 
(3) Yield rate. Yield jDer rai cxpected at the time of 
harvest is also one of the important factors for farmers to decide 
on the production of sugarcane and competing crops. Yield per rai 
of sugarcane differs from variety to variety. The variety grown in 
each region is usually the same although that grown in the North-
Eastern Region differs from the other regions due to lack of water. 
Expected yield rate when regressed with time is usually of a semi-
log type as is shown in Figure 5.1. With improved technology, yield 
is expected to increase over time, but the rate of increase is 
expected to decrease through time.^ 
FIGURE 5.1 
YIELD CHANGE OVER TIME 
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(4) Cost of inputs. Farmers' decisions on the production 
of sugarcane and other competing crops will be influenced by their 
expectation of the cost of purchasing inputs per rai of each crop. The 
1 See Appendix D for regression analysis. 
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quantity of inputs used determines the cost of inputs. A higher cost 
usually means lower profits to the farmers. The expected relative 
cost of purchased inputs per rai of sugarcane and competing crops will 
therefore affect sugarcane production. 
(5) Weather. Production of any crop is affected by the 
level of rainfall, humidity and temperature. The level of rainfall 
especially affects the production of sugarcane and its sugar content 
(sucrose). Too much rain dilutes the sucrose content and may kill the 
plant. If the purchasing system is by sucrose content, the price 
received by the farmers will be lower. On the other hand, if the rain-
fall is too low, the sugarcane will be dry as well as affecting the 
sucrose content and the weight. Rainfall is also one of the main 
determinants of the area planted, especially since there is no irri-
gation system available. Sugarcane farmers plant the new sugarcane 
at the onset of the wet season. If there is not enough rain to soften 
the soil, farmers are faced with difficulties in sowing, which may 
result in a reduced area planted. A dummy variable is used here. 
Zero for 1500-2000 millimetres and 1 otherwise. 
(6) Sugarcane Farmers' Association. Chapter 3 has already 
discussed the role and activities of the Association in detail. It is 
believed that the Association is one of the factors which enables 
higher sugarcane prices (at factory level). With the bargaining power 
of the Association, farmers expect to get higher prices, thus the 
introduction of an effective Sugarcane Farmers' Association may affect 
production and the sugarcane planted area. An attempt should therefore 
be made to see whether the existence of a Sugarcane Farmers' Association 
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does have any effect on farmers' decisions on the sugarcane planted 
area. Dummy variable will be used. Zero for non-existence and 
1 otherwise. 
(7) Government intervention. The Thai Government con-
trolled the sugarcane price in every region of Thailand during the 
years 1961 to 1965. In the Eastern Region, the price was 125 baht 
IJcr tonne. In the Central Region, the price was 115 baht per tonne. 
The price in the North and North-Eastern Regions was slightly lower. 
The criteria used by the Government to impose these prices is not 
known. 
The reason for controlling price in that period was that 
the Government had created a "Sugar Industry Aid Fund" to subsidise 
the sugar mills in order to stimulate exports. 
In 1975, the Government introduced guaranteed minimum 
sugarcane prices (at factory level) for all regions at 300 baht per 
tonne. Actually, the Government had no intention of interfering 
with the price-setting process but agreement could not be reached 
between the Sugarcane Farmers' Association and the sugar factories, 
even after the second meeting. Hence, the Government had to step in. 
At present, this guaranteed minimum price is still in effect. 
Again, dummy variable will be used. Zero for no policy 
and 1 otherwise. 
(8) Activity of Quotaman. It has been explained in 
Chapter 3 how the quota system can affect the sugarcane price received 
by the farmers. From the farmers' returns are deducted the transport 
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cost, payinonLs duo to the quotainan, o.y. tlie interest rate on loans 
borrowed from the quotaman, commission, and so on. Dummy variable is 
used to represent aggressiveness of quotaman. Zero when farmer expects 
that quotaman's activity is aggressive and 1 otherwise. 
(9) Area of sugarcane removed in year t. The area 
removed is always less than or equal to the area planted to sugarcane 
three years earlier (year t-3). With the assumption that there are no 
damaged plants due to flood, fire, drought or insects, area removed 
is always the area planted in year t-3. This is because all the second 
ratoon is removed. The economic rationale behind this is that the 
discounted future returns from the three year old crop are lower than 
the discounted future returns from replacement plantings. This can be 
largely attributed to the significant drop in yield and sucrose content 
after the second ratoon crop and the consequent decrease in returns. 
Although fertilizer can be used to try and lessen the yield decrease, 
it would appear that the costs involved are greater than the costs of 
replacing the crop. 
5.3 The General Model 
The initial model developed here is based upon the hypo-
thesis that the actual area planted is actually the desired area 
planted. Farmers have no difficulties in adjusting the number of rai 
to their desired level. The above information can be expressed as a 
functional relationship as follows: 
NP^ = f(S, P , P , C, Y , Y , R, G, O, W, Q) t s c s c 
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where: 
NP^ = new planting in year t 
S = stock of sugarcane, i.e. new planting in year t-1 and t-2 
P^ = expected price of sugarcane in year t 
P = expected price of competing crops in year t 
C = expected cost of input 
Y^ = expected yield of sugarcane in year t 
Y - expected yield of competing crops in year t c 
R = area under sugarcane removed in year t, which under the 
assumption of no damaged plants, is the area planted in 
year t-3 
G = Government intervention 
O = existence of Sugarcane Farmers' Association 
W = weather condition 
Q = quotaman's activity 
The estimated equation is therefore as follows: 
NP = a + b,P + b^P + b^C + b,Y + b^Y + b^G + b O t I s 2 c 3 4 s 5 c 6 7 
4- bgW + bgR^ 4- b^^a + u^ 
The above equation will be estimated using linear and 
log linear equation forms. For the linear form, a coefficient reflects 
the absolute change in dependent variable resulting from a unit change 
in the independent variable. For log linear form, log value of both 
dependent and independent variables is used for estimation. Hence the 
coefficient can be interpreted as percentage change in dependent vari-
able which results from a 1 per cent change in independent variable. 
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i.e. the coefficient can be directly interpreted as an elasticity 
estimate. For the linear equation a mean elasticity estimate can 
be divided by multiplying the coefficient by the ratio of 
mean independent variable 
mean dependent variable 
Standard error of estimate will be great if one uses the 
form which does not yield the best fit to the available data. Standard 
2 
statistical tests (R , F-test, etc.) will be used to consider which of 
the estimated forms provides the best fit. 
It is expected that the new planting area would be posi-
tively associated with changes in its expected own price but negatively 
associated with changes in the. expected price of competing crops, and 
changes in the expected cost of sugarcane production. The coefficients 
of Y and Y may be of a negative or positive sign, depending on the s e 
level of production of the crops per se that the farmer expects. If 
the farmer has a fixed level of production in mind, the expected yield 
increase may not lead to an increase in new planting area. If the 
farmer expects sugarcane yield to decrease, he may increase the new 
planting area to maintain that fixed level of production. On the 
other hand, if the farmer does not have a fixed level of production 
in mind, expected yield increase may lead to increase in the new 
planting area. 
The coefficient of the Government variable is expected to 
be positive. This means that changes in Government policy have a 
positive effect on farmers' decisions. The new planting area is 
responding positively to change in Government policy. A zero 
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coefficient means that new planting is not influenced by changes in 
Government policy. Worse still is a negative coefficient which indi-
cates that Government policy has detrimental effects. The Government, 
in order to make an effective policy, should look into the cause of 
the non-responsiveness of the farmers. 
The coefficient of quotaman variable is expected to be 
of a negative sign. Any change in quotamen's activities influences 
farmers' decisions on new planting area. Quotamen's commissions, 
interest paid of loans, and other payments to quotamen all affect 
income earned by farmers. The more aggressive the quotaman, the lower 
the cxpcctcd farm income - the result of which is low incentives to 
plant more sugarcane, and vice versa. 
The coefficient of weather condition variable is expected 
to be positive. It indicates that favourable moisture conditions 
during planting time encourage a little more area to be put under 
sugarcane. This is especially true when irrigation facilities are 
not available. 
The coefficient of removed area variable is expected to 
be positive. Given favourable price conditions, the more areas 
that have to be removed, the more new planting areas, and vice versa. 
The coefficient of Sugarcane Farmers' Association is 
expected to be positive. With the expected increase in price due 
to the existence of the Association and its bargaining power, 
farmers increase new planting area. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL/ESTIMABLE MODEL 
6.1 Data 
6.1.1 The Limitation and Adjustment 
Unfortunately, major limitations with respect to both 
availability and accuracy of the data necessitate the exclusion of 
certain variables. Consequently some adjustments of the data and 
the model are inevitable. 
(a) Planted area data. For sugarcane the area newly 
planted in any one year is not known. This presents a very serious 
problem for the proposed model, since new plantings in year t consti-
tute the dependent variable and plantings in year t-1, t-2 and t-3 
years appear as independent variables. To try and overcome this 
problem a simplification of the model, based on total area data, will 
be used as outlined shortly. The Sugar Institute collects data yearly 
(specific date and time is not known). There is no missing data on 
the planted area of sugarcane. For maize, the data is obtained from 
the Division of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives. The Eastern Region presents some problems because data 
for 1969 to 1971 are missing, the reason for which is not known. 
Possibly it was because data was not collected or because there was 
no maize planted during the period. The author assumes the second 
reason. For mungbean, the data on planted area in 1970 is missing 
for all regions. It has been assumed that no mungbean was planted in 
1970. For cassava and rice, no such problem was encountered. 
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(b) Annual avcrayo yield. Yield data is obtained by 
dividing total production of each crop by its area planted in that 
year. With improved technology, and better varieties of crops, it 
is oxpccLcd that, with fairly constant and favourable woaLlior con-
ditions togetlier with good fertility, the yield will be improved 
through time (except for cassava, where fertilizer has never been 
applied to the soil. This is particularly true in the case of 
Thailand). Yield is regressed against time from 1968 to 1975. 
Predicted yield is used in the study as a measure of expected yield 
instead of the actual yield. 
(c) Price data. Price information presents several 
problems. Ideally, farm prices should be used in the study but for 
sugarcane this data is not available. The factory price and farm 
price of sugarcane were compared and it was found that there is no 
reliability in the farm price. For example, farm prices in the 
Northern Region in 1972/73 were 100.28 baht per tonne but in 1973/74 
they were 94.90 baht per tonne, a decrease in price while farm prices 
in the other regions were increasing. Factory price from 1972/73 to 
1973/74 showed an increase from 155.08 baht per tonne to 177.79 baht 
per tonne, which contrasts with the decrease in farm price. More-
over, there are missing data and the farm prices for the Eastern 
Region were not recorded. Hence, factory price is used as a proxy 
by assuming that quotamen, whose activities account for the difference 
in price, try to keep their proportion of income stable from year to 
year. The cassava price also presents problems. Data are missing or 
unreliable. For example, in 1973 the cassava price in the Northern 
Region was 0.04 baht per kilogram, in North-Eastern Region 0.27 baht 
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per kilogram, while for the Central and Southern Regions it was 
5.92 baht per kilogram and 1.85 baht per kilogram respectively. 
It was decided to use the whole kingdom farm price of cassava for 
all four regions under study. As for maize and mungbean, the only 
problem is missing data. It was decided, therefore, to find the 
missing data by comparing the regional farm price with the whole-
kingdom farm price, observing the per cent increase or decrease 
in the whole-kingdom farm price of the year in question over the 
previous year and adjusting the missing regional farm price 
accordingly. 
For the Eastern Region as a whole, several difficulties 
were encountered. According to the Sugar Institute, sugarcane 
growing areas are divided into four regions - the Central, Eastern, 
Northern and North-Eastern Regions. But officially, all Thai 
statistics are recorded for the Central, Northern, North-Eastern, 
and Southern Regions. The Eastern Region, according to the classifica-
tion of the Sugar Institute, is, in fact, part of the Central Region 
as classified by official statistics. The price of sugarcane is 
specified according to the Sugar Institute. Prices of other competing 
crops are recorded according to the normal Thai statistics. Farm 
price of sugarcane is collected by the Division of Agricultural 
Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and not by the 
Sugar Institute which is the reason why farm prices in the Eastern 
Region are not recorded. Therefore, the price of competing crops in 
the Eastern Region used in the study is, in fact, the price in the 
Central Region. 
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(d) Cost data. It is not ixjssibLc to get annual data 
on the cost of production for sugarcane and competing crops for the 
eight years under study. For some of the crops like mungbean, cost 
data is available for only one year. Thus it is impossible to 
include this factor in the model to be estimated. 
(e) Rainfall data. The data on rainfall is on a yearly 
basis and a record is usually not kept in the provinces that grow 
sugarcane. If the data is used it will not represent the true decision-
making process of the sugarcane farmers. Furthermore, the study has a 
very low number of observations. Inclusion of another variable means 
a loss of a further degree of freedom. For the abovementioned reasons, 
it was decided not to include the weather variable in the model. 
(f) Sugarcane Farmers' Association. This variable is 
dropped because the available data on farm price is from 1968 to 1975, 
the period throughout which the Association existed. Thus, the inclu-
sion of this variable into the model is unnecessary. 
(g) Government intervention. As mentioned before, the 
available data on farm price is from 1968 to 1975. Therefore, it was 
decided not to include this variable in the model. But it should be 
borne in mind that the speculation by farmers on the Government policy 
on sugarcane price may play a very important role in their decisions. 
(h) Activity of quotamen. Data on payments to quotamen 
are impossible to collect. Thus, it was decided not to include it as 
another independent variable. 
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G.1.2 Period of Siiudy 
Even though the sugarcane price (at regional factory level) 
can be obtained from 1961 to 1975, competing crops price (regional 
farm price) can only be obtained from 1968 to 1975 which is only eight 
years. An attempt was made to use the wholesale price of competing 
crops to get 14 observations, but the result obtained was much poorer 
than using the regional farm price for competing crops of the eight 
year period. 
6.1.3 Reliability of Data 
The regional farm prices for competing crops and area 
planted to competing crops in the sugarcane centre are primary data 
obtained from the Division of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives. These data are not published. The 
published data are those of the whole kingdom farm price and the 
total area under particular crops. The author does not know of the 
adjustments that are made to the primary data before they are 
averaged out to obtain the whole-kingdom farm price and the total 
area planted. Little is known about the precision of the data pub-
lished, let alone the unpublished primary data. The yield rate of 
any crop is obtained by dividing the total production of one crop by 
its total area planted. Again, the primary data are used. 
Sugarcane data are collected by the Sugar Institute. 
This information is presumably more reliable than that collected by 
the Agricultural Economics Division whose functions are wider than 
the Sugar Institute which specializes in the sugarcane and sugar field. 
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The method of data collection and survey for all crops 
under study is not known. In the absence of information on these 
matters, the precision and reliability of the data are very suspect 
and, therefore, this must be borne in mind when interpreting the 
estimated supply functions. 
6.2 Simplification of the Model 
From the discussion in Section 6.1, the general model 
presented in Chapter 5 needs to be simplified. 
Since sugarcane is a ratoon crop, once a crop is planted 
it will remain planted for three harvests (assuming that farmers do 
not remove the crop prior to the second ratoon season); the area 
planted in total to sugarcane in any one year will be the sum of 
plantings in years t, t-1, and t-2, i.e.: 
A^ = NP^ + + (1) 
where 
A^ = total area planted in period t 
NP^f NP^ NP^ 2 planting in periods t, t-1 and t-2 respectively. 
Similarly: 
Subtracting (2) from (1), we obtain: 
AA^ = NP^ -
where Aa^ " ^t ~ \ - l 
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NP is composed of replacement of the sugarcane planted in loeriod t-3 
and the net change in planted area AA^ (which may be positive or 
negative). 
The change in area in any year will be the net result of 
two opposite forces - the removal of the crop planted three years ago 
and the newly planted crop this year. If the change in area is nega-
tive then the new planted area is not sufficient to offset the area 
lost by removal of the three-year-old crop. This may be due to several 
reasons: 
(1) Poor gross returns and non-price conditions in 
the present period, e.g. Government policy on restriction of land to 
be planted with sugarcane. 
(2) Very favourable gross retiorns and other non-price 
conditions in the period three years ago (and hence abnormally high 
plantings in that period). 
(3) A combination of both. 
Similarly, if the change in area is positive then the loss 
in area from crop removal is more than offset by new planted areas in 
the current period. Again, a very relevant influence here may be the 
gross returns and the non-price conditions prevailing in one or other, 
or both of the two time periods. The above information together with 
the information in Section 4.1 suggests that NP^ and may be 
determined by gross returns, weather conditions, cost of inputs, 
existence of sugarcane farmers' associations, activity of quotamen 
and Government intervention in the two periods. As mentioned earlier 
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in Section 4.1, i.e. the impossibility to include the latter five 
variables in the model, means that the only main determinant left 
is gross returns which therefore will be used as a proxy for 
profitability. Thus the possible model is: 
Aa = f(R - R ) (4) t t t-3 
which means that the total change in planted area in period t is 
determined by the change in profit between the two periods. If no 
cost information is included then there is an implicit assumption 
that production costs remain consistent over time. 
Consideration must also be given to the prices of alter-
native crops. The sugarcane farmer is likely to be concerned with 
the profitability of sugarcane relative to the profitability of other 
best alternative competing crops. Hence: 
Aa = f(n^ -n^ J (5) t t t-3 
where IT is relative profitability of sugarcane in period t; and 11, t t -5 
is relative profitability of sugarcane in period t-3. 
Gross returns used as a measure of profitability measure 
is defined here as price times yield per rai. This results in a signi-
ficantly better explanatory_model than using price alone. However, 
in using gross returns we assume a 10 per cent increase in yield has 
the same effect on acreage as a 10 per cent increase in price. 
Furthermore, because it is in relative terms, the model faces a zero 
degree homogeneity constant with respect to the effects of relative 
prices and yields. That is, a 10 per cent increase in prices of both 
crops leaves area planted unchanged. 
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5Somc form oC xjrico expectation ia actaaiiy used in the 
estimating model because farmers form expectations of prices for the 
current year which in turn determines the amount of area planted. 
Hence equation (5) becomes: 
AA st fdf - (6) 
where: 
e e P X Y st st 
e e P 4- ^ Y ^ ct ct 
expected relative profitability 
of sugarcane to competing crop in 
year t 
e e P X Y e^ = st-3 st-3 
t-3 e e P X Y ct-3 ct-3 
expected relative profitability 
of sugarcane to competing crop in 
year t-3 
= f (T) = expected yield of the i^^ crop in 
year t 
== time trend from 1968 to 1975 
6.3 Search for Specification of Farmers' Expectation of Price 
The expectation of price formed by farmers is different 
when different expectation models are applied. These may be the naive 
model or the distributed lag models which will be discussed briefly 
below: 
(1) The naive model. The more general form is that the 
expected price in period t is determined by the previous year price: 
p = P t t-1 
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Again, the expected price can be the mean price of the 
previous two, three or four years. 
However, this is a gross over-simplification (in the case 
of the OLS) of the complex phenomenon of price expectation formation. 
Parameters obtained from the models, as a result, may be unrealistic 
and lower than those obtained from other models.^ 
(2) Distributed lag model. This model implies that 
expected price in a year is the weighted sum of all past prices prior 
to that year. That is: 
e CO ' CO P = E W P . where E W. = 1 and W. > 0 t . ^  1 t-i . , 1 1 1=1 x=l 
W. can be estimated directly by least squares if the 1 
number of relevant values over which the distributed lag extends is 
small and the successive past observations are not collinear. Other-
wise some restrictive assijmption about the pattern of weights is 
necessary, giving rise to different estimating methods, some of which 
are simimarized here: 
(a) The arithmetic lag structure suggested by Fisher 
(1935). This is a structure of weights where the weights of successive 
observations decline in an arithmetic progression as one goes back 
in time. 
e 2 
K = , , S (n-i) P^ . t n(n+l) . ^  t-i 1=0 
1 M. Nerlove, "Estimates of the Elasticities of Supply of Selected 
Agricultural Commodities", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 38, 
pp. 496-509. 
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wliere n is the number of years over which the distributed lag extends. 
Q 
By iterating n, different values of P^ can be obtained and when sub-
stituted in the model, the one which gives the best fit of the model 2 can then be chosen to estimate the supply response. 
(b) The geometric lag structure. Koyck's general distri-
buted lag function is: 
A^ = a -f + a3P^_3 u^ (1) 
But the close intercorrelation of successive values of 
prices (P) leads to problems of multicollinearity. Thus, he suggests 
that the weights of successive observations decline in a geometric 
progression as one goes back in time because it is normally expected 
that the more remote values would tend to have a smaller influence 
than the more recent ones. If the coefficient of the k^ *^  lag is the 
first one in such a geometrically declining series, we have: 
a . = 0 < 0 < 1 j > 0 (2) k+: k 
Substituting (2) in (1) gives: 
\ = ^ ^ V t - 1 ^ ••• V t - k ^ ^ 
+ . .. + u^ (3] 
Equation (3) simply states that after the first k lags the 
coefficients of P decline in geometric progression, each one being 0 
times its predecessor where 0 is zero or positive but less than one. 
• 2 
2 A regression was run using the arithmetic lag structure but R 
obtained was very low. It is as low as 0.0009. 
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The Koyck model postulates the existence of a distributed 
lag. Nerlove, however, accounts for its existence in the adaptive 
price expectations model, i.e.: 
p* _ p*^^ = ^^^t-l " ^t-1^ 0 < 6 < 1 
where 3 is the coefficient of expectation. 
The model assumes that all past prices must be considered 
but in practice prices in the very distant past can be ignored as 3 
is zero or positive but less than 1. The exact point at which such 
past prices can be ignored depends on the size of g. The bigger the 
size of 3f the m.ore the farmer depends on his previous expectations 
and therefore the larger the number of past prices that must be 
included. 
The number of past prices that should be included in order 
that the error be less or equal to some small positive value, e, can 
be calculated from the following formula: 
1 - (1-3)^-1 < e 
where n is the number of past prices. 
The Nerlovian model can be extended to include other 
independent variables. 
The Koyck and the Nerlovian models introduce problems of 
serial correlation, even though they reduce the multicollinearity 
problem. 
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(c) Assume no structure. Timbergen suggests that the 
lagged prices should be added successively in the estimation of the 
model until the signs of the coefficients become erratic and cease to 
make sense, i.e. there is a change in sign or magnitude of the 
coefficients. The typical distributed lag supply function is thus: 
oo A = a + T. b.P . + u t . ^  1 t-i t 1=1 
However, the model is applicable only when the successive 
observations of the lagged variables are not intercorrelated. This 
is especially true with price data. The model will yield unstable 
estimates of the parameters and the variance of the estimates is high. 
Furthermore, stopping the addition of successive lagged prices for 
estimation when the signs become erratic is an a priori bias because 
it does not mean that the lagged variable has no influence when the 
coefficients become erratic. 
It was decided, in the analysis of the supply response of 
sugarcane farmers in Thailand, to try the Nerlovian geometric lag. 
Fisher arithmetic lag, and naive model where the price expectation is 
formed from a one year lagged, a two year average price, and a two 
year lagged price. 
6.4 Adjustment of the Simplified Model 
If we assume that, no matter what level of NP, i.e. new 
planting is desired, the farmer is more concerned with the total area 
planted to sugarcane and that he has no difficulties in adjusting it 
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to the desired level; that is, it is assumed that per unit return 
of NP^ is independent of then: 
A* = A = f (currcnt expected profitability) whore A* St St I. I J 
is the desired area planted to sugarcane and A is the actual area st 
planted to sugarcane. 
Hence, the simplified model is adjusted to: 
A ^ - f(nf) st t 
e e P X Y = st st 
e e P X Y ^ ct ct 
Y® = f(T) it 
where: 
A = total area planted to sugarcane st 
n® = expected relative profitability of sugarcane to 
^ competing crop in year t 
Y® = expected yield of the i^^ crop in year t 
it 
T = time trend from 1968 to 1975 
pS pG ^ expected price of sugarcane and competing crop in 
ct ^ 
6.5 Specification of the Model 
Assuming that the variables in the general model in 
Section 6.3 have a linear relationship in their real value and adding 
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an error term, the statistical supply model for sugarcane can be 
written as: 
A ^ = a^ + a, n® + u St 0 1 t t 
e Y _ = log T + e It ^ t 
e e „e P X Y n, = St St t e e P ^ ^ Y ^ ct ct 
where: 
A^^ = total area planted to sugarcane in year t 
n^ = expected relative profitability of sugarcane to competing 
crop per rai in year t 
e th Y, = expected yield of the i crop it 
= time trend from 1968 to 1975 
P , P = expected price of sugarcane and competing crops respectively st ct 
u , e = error terms t t 
6.6 Specified Form of Expectation and Choice of Lag Structure 
Whatever estimating techniques and form of expectation 
used, inaccurate results are expected when data used in the study is 
unreliable, other data is unavailable, and when there are only a few 
observations. Therefore, it was decided to use only a few of the 
expectation models. The naive model of price expectation (1 year lag, 
2 year average price, 2 year lag, and current price) and the Nerlovian 
price expectations were tried. The estimation models are: 
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(1) The naive model: 
(A) = „ . a, ( J t z L l J k , , e^ 
P X Y ct-1 ct 
P St-1 . , . where is relative price lagged one year. 
ct-1 
e P X Y 
(B) A = a^ + a, — ) + e^ St 0 1 - ^ ^e t 
ct ct 
where P and P are the previous 2 year average prices of sugarcane s t c t 
and competing crops respectively. 
e P ^ X Y , , , st-2 St. , (C) A^^ = a^ . a^ (- — ) e^ 
ct-2 st 
^st-2 where is relative price lagged two years. 
^ct-2 
e 
P X Y 
ct ct 
where P and P are the current prices of sugarcane and competing St ct 
crops respectively. 
Even though the price of sugarcane is determined after 
the sugarcane has been grown, i.e. the sowing season is in May or 
June (at the onset of the rainy season) and the price is determined 
later through a bargaining process in November prior to the sugar 
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production, it may be assumed that the sugarcane farmers' association 
has a target price set in mind. The association usually sets the 
negotiated price higher than the target one so that after the bar-
gaining takes place the association achieves more or less the target 
price. However, as the executive members of the association are 
quotamen and sugarcane farmers themselves, the expected current price 
may be known beforehand. Prices for the competing crops do not have 
to go through the bargaining process, and they are available throughout 
the current year. Since it is assumed that prices of competing crops 
play an important role in farmers' decision-making, their current 
levels therefore may have an impact on farmers' decisions. This is 
the reason for using current prices. 
(2) Nerlovian price expectations: 
A = a + b n ^ + u (1) St t t 
where: 
A = total area planted to sugarcane in period t St 
n® relative expected gross returns of sugarcane in period t 
u^ = error term 
and 3 is the coefficient of expectation. 
The above equation states that for each period the farmer 
revises the change in the gross returns ratio he expects to occur in 
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the cominy period in proportion to the mistake he made in predicting 
price this period. 
From equation (1) the expected profitability variable in 
period t can be written as: 
t b b St b t 
Similarly, 
= - ^ u (4) t-1 b b st-1 b t-1 
Hence, equation (2) can be written as: 
Substituting from (4) in (5), we obtain: 
Substituting 11^  from (6) into (1), gives: 
a3 + b3 + (1-3) + "t " ""t-l 
and the final equation becomes: 
where a^ = a3, b^ = b3, c^ = (1-3) and v^ = u^ - (1-3) 
A St 
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where: 
A^^ = area planted to sugarcane in year t 
= relative gross returns in year t-1 
= lagged area planted to sugarcane in year t-1 
v^ = error term 
6.7 Results and Discussion 
The results obtained from the various regression relation-
ships using O.L.S. method are given below. 
(A) Simple Linear Regression 
(1) Naive Model (price lagged one year) 
(i) Central Region: 
A = 1657340.94 - 185704.459 11® 
^^ (114853.695) 
R^ = 0.34 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 284571.734 
D-W Test = 0.99295 
(ii) Eastern Region: 
A = 131871.038 + 108881.3150 11® 
(45934.0611) 
r2 = 0.53 D.F: = 6 S.E.E. = 52243.8111 
D-W Test = 0.96421 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A = -253610.782 + 206240.1990 jf 
^^ (62662.7294) 
r2 = 0.67 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 46157.72470 
D-W Test = 1.02539 
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'iv) Nortli-liasLcrn Kogioti: 
A = 19010.97150 + 76535.03880 IT® 
^ (56059.88340) ^ 
2 
R =0.27 D.F. = G S.E.E. = 30321.23890 
D-W Test = 0.34 741 
(2) Naive Model (2 year average price) 
:i) Central Region: 
A - 2781365.2 - 406108.786 11® 
^^ (123765.904) 
R^ = 0.73 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 177058.79300 
D-W Test = 0.36443 
(ii) Eastern Region: 
A = 95442.71120 + 154229.54300 if 
^^ (82468.57080) 
R^ 0.47 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 59849.87580 
D-W Test = 0.64032 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A = -414893.142 + 313588.22000 jf 
^^ (111456.32600) 
r2 ^ D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 49638.74940 
D-W Test = 1.24048 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A = 45808.28770 + 46728.39560 11® 
(118537.69300) 
r2 = 0.04 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 38389.25710 
D-W Test = 0.44494 
Ill 
(3) Naive Model (2 year lagged price) 
(i) Central Region: 
A^^ = 144361.45 - 130124.367 11° 
^ (132827.808) ^ 
2 
R = 0.19 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 305514.06100 
D-W Test = 0.65088 
(ii) Eastern Region: 
A = 236182.703 + 40757.57110 11® 
^ (126247.56500) ^ 
2 
R = 0.03 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 80892.08692 
D-W Test = 0.37393 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A = -212181.794 + 196379.50100 H® 
^^ (165887.54900) 
R^ = 0.26 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 73728.25950 
D-W Test = 0.89353 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A = 119790.065 - 60312.59330 n® 
(84666.07410) 
= 0.11 D.F. - 5 S.E.E. = 36859.73610 
D-W Test = 0.91978 
(4) Naive Model (current price) 
(i) Central Region: 
A = 986813.605 - 68947.60860 11® 
(143035.98200) 
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2 
R = D . F . = 7 S . E . E . = 361612 .38300 
D-W Test = 0 . 25167 
( i i ) Eastern Region: 
A^^ = 164547 .97800 + 59533 .57230 11® 
^ (19052 .43250) ^ 
2 
R = 0 . 62 D .F . = 7 S . E . E . = 50669 .75530 
D-W Test = 1 . 18890 
( i i i ) Northern Region: 
A = -88222 .25650 + 87724 .93720 
^ (11138.42750) ^ 
2 
R = 0 . 91 D . F . = 7 S . E . E . = 22470 .38 
D-W Test = 1 .81738 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A = 19537 .74200 + 59305 .76740 IT® 
(13806.01730) ^ 
R^ = 0 . 7 5 D .F . = 7 S . E . E . = 16937 .00680 
D-W Test = 1 .00053 
(5) Nerlovian Expectation Model 
(i) Central Region: 
A = 458104 .342 - 62492 .22120 H + 1-02024 A 
(33884 .73420) (0 .12422) 
R^ = 0 . 9 6 D . F . - 6 S . E . E . = 75278 .72810 
D-W Test = 2 . 69438 
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Eastern Region: 
A ^ = 36307.85810 + 60421.56080 n _ + 0.65411 A 
^ (45242.73210) ^ (0.34560) 
2 
R = 0.75 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 42424.79900 
D-W Test = 1.62853 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A = -45675.55990 + 24933.26920 ^ _ + 1.57307 A 
® (86813.21940) ^ (0.64064) ® 
R^ = 0.87 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. - 32590.63070 
D-W Test = 2.13702 
! iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A - -47203.74960 + 37220.63520 11 + 1.52914 A 
(38742.03980) (0.54020) ^ 
R^ = 0.76 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 19561.74760 
D-W Test = 1.33559 
(B) Log Linear Regression 
(1) Naive Model (price lagged one year) 
(i) Central Region: 
A = 6.94906 - 1.62045 
^^ (0.94188) 
r2 ^ ^ 5 S.E.E. = 0.18050 
D-W Test - 0.92289 
(ii) Eastern Region: 
A ^ = 5.38041 + 0.49306 IT S t 1" (0.23368) 
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R = 0.47 D.P. - 6 S.E.E. = 0.08273 
D-W Test = 1.05149 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A ^ = 0.12067 + 3.29675 II st t (1 .12773) 
R =0.63 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 0.12426 
D-W Test = 1.17126 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A = 4.9421 + 0.62292 H 
(0.50518) ^ 
R = 0.23 D.F. = 6 
D-W Test = 0.42164 
S.E.E. = 0.15546 
(2) Naive Model (two year average price) 
(i) Central Region: 
A = 7.56738 - 2.47652 H 
(0.92614) 
R =0.64 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 0.12018 
D-W Test = 0.35844 
(ii) Eastern Region: 
A = 5.39060 + 0.67707 II 
^^ (0.36269) 
R^ = 0.47 D.F. = 5 
D-W Test == 0.63533 
S.E.E. = 0.08974 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A ^ = 3.86792 + 4.78771 IT 
^ (1.79565) ^ 
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R =0.64 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 0.21739 
D-W Test = 1.39111 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A = 4.91799 + 0.34011 11 
® (1.00154) ^ 
R = 0.03 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 0.19380 
D-W Test = 0.44033 
(3) Naive Model (price lagged 2 years) 
(i) Central Region: 
A = 6.56759 - 1.00338 Jl 
^ (1.02343) 
R =0.19 D.F. = 5 S.E.E. = 0.18017 
D-W Test = 0.67692 
(ii) Eastern Region: 
A =• 5.42811 + 0.22389 H 
^^ (0.49250) 
R = 0.05 D.F. =-5 S.E.E. = 0.11970 
D-W Test = 0.39256 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A = 4.26659 + 3.14097 11 
^^ (2.21980) 
2 
R = 0.33 D.F. = 5 
D-W Test = 0.91190 
S.E.E. = 0.29575 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A ^ = 4.76973 - 0.52652 11 st t (0.73057) 
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R = 0.11 D.F. 5 S.E.E. = 0 .18493 
D-W Test = 0.92102 
(4) Naive Model (current price) 
(i) Central Region: 
A = 6 . 3 7 8 5 5 - 0 . 9 0 0 2 5 II 
( 1 . 3 6 3 4 8 ) ^ 
R = 0.07 D.F. - 7 S.E.E. = 0.26863 
D-W Test = 0.22950 
(ii) Eastern Region: 
A = 5.34228 + 0.37716 11 
^^ (0.17327) 
R = 0.44 D.F. = 7 S.E.E. = 0.09985 
D-W Test = 1.05501 
(iii) Northern Region: 
A = 4.26867 + 1.99749 11 
(0.32979) 
R = 0.86 D.F. = 1 S.E.E. = 0.12624 
D-W Test = 1.62322 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A = 4.88813 + 0.63666 11 
(0.22996) 
R^ = 0.56 D.F. = 7 
D-W Test = 1.04679 
S.E.E. - 0.11617 
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(5) Nerlovian Expectation Model 
(i) Central Region: 
A^^ - 1.74842 - 0.52961 n _ + 0.77817 A 
^ (0.24326) ^ (0.08116) 
2 R = 0.97 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. == 0.04123 
D-W Test = 2.43981 
:ii) Eastern Region: 
A = 2.57864 + 0.34718 11 _ + 6.52378 A 
® (0.20675) ^ (0.28155) ^^ 
2 R = 0.72 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 0.06772 
D-W Test = 1.89356 
;iii) Northern Region: 
A = -0.91354 + 0.43077 H _ + 1.20045 A 
^^ (1.53533) ^ (0.53790) ® 
R^ = 0.75 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 0.15987 
D-W Test = 2.14850 
(iv) North-Eastern Region: 
A = 0.01453 + 0.35605 Jl + 1.02193 A 
(0.41351) (0.49450) 
R^ = 0.63 D.F. = 6 S.E.E. = 0.12089 
D-W Test = 1.20242 
Looking at the coefficients obtained from different models, 
with two year lagged price as the expected price, more of the coeffi-
cients obtained are significantly different from zero. Using the two 
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year avcrayc prico , only the Northern Region has the coefficient of 
0 
n^ s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f ferent from zero at 2 . 5 per cent significance 
level . For price lagged one year. Eastern and Northern Regions have 
G 
coef f ic ients of 11^  s igni f icantly different from zero at 5 per cent 
and 1 per cent s ignif icance level respectively (at 5 per cent and 
2 . 5 per cent s ignif icance level respectively for log l inear regression) . 
Using the current pr ice , Eastern, Northern and North-Eastern Regions 
Q 
have coef f ic ients of H^ s ignif icantly different from zero at 1 per 
cent, 0 . 0 5 per cent and 0 . 5 per cent significance level respectively 
(at 5 per cent, 0 . 0 5 per cent and 2 . 5 per cent significance level 
respectively for log l inear regression) . For the Nerlovian Expectation 
Model, the coef f ic ient of TI^  ^ is insignif icant for al l regions (both 
l inear and log l inear regression) , Northern and North-Eastern Regions 
at 0 . 0 5 per cent, 2 . 5 per cent and 2 . 5 per cent significance level 
respectively ( 0 . 0 5 per cent, 5 per cent and 5 per cent respectively 
for log l inear regression) . However, the coeff icients of ^^^ 
mostly greater than 1 which yields a negative coeff icient of expecta-
tion (3) except for the Eastern Region (both linear and log linear 
regression) and Central Region (log l inear regression on ly ) . 
Therefore, using the Nerlovian Expectation Model, the Naive 
Model with price lagged one year, and the current price (in terms of 
acceptable sign and s tat i st ica l ly significant coefficient) seems to 
work for the Eastern Region. Using the Naive Model with price lagged 
one year, the 2 year average price and the current price seem to work 
for the Northern Region. As for the Central Region, the only model 
that works is the Nerlovian Expectation Model with the coefficient 
s ign i f icant ly d i f ferent from zero at 0 . 0 5 per cent confidence level . 
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For the North-Eastern Region, it is the Naive Model with current price 
which works and the coefficient of H^ is significantly different from 
zero at 0.5 per cent confidence level for linear regression and at 
2 2.5 per cent confidence level for log linear regression. The R obtained 
from the Nerlovian Expectation Model seems to be generally higher. The 
second highest is that obtained from the Naive Model with current price. 
2 When comparing R between the Eastern and Northern Regions, it is the 
2 
latter region which has the higher R . Also, the standard error of 
estimates for the latter region is lower. 
All of the four regions can be grouped together, by 
assuming that sugarcane farmers, no matter what region they are in, 
have the same response function. By doing so, it enables one to 
obtain a larger number of observations. The results are as follows: 
(A) Simple Linear Regression 
(1) Nerlovian Expectation Model 
A = -6104.57883 + 11952.33850 n + 1.16187 A . 
(7982.86695) (0.06391) 
^ D.F. = 27 S.E.E. = 58089.89190 
D-W Test = 1.47 
(2) Naive Model (price lagged one year) 
e 
A = 32723.85390 + 109176.79700 H 
(21850.25950) 
r2 = 0.49 D.F. = 27 S.E.E. = 214791.37700 
D-W Test 1.71 
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(3) Naive Model (current price) 
^st " 529.53381 + 105134.63600 jf 
^ (19041.66230) ^ 
2 
R = 0.50 D.F. = 31 S.E.E. = 202285.17300 
D-W Test =1.88 
(B) Log Linear Regression 
(1) Nerlovian Expectation Model 
A = 0.34792 + 0.14068 11 _ + 0.94359 A 
(0.07778) ^ (0.05825) 
R^ = 0.96 D.F. = 27 S.E.E. = 0.10150 
D-W Test =1.24 
(2) Naive Model (price lagged one year) 
A = 5.00360 + 0.97590 if 
(0.19361) 
R^ = 0.49 D.F. = 27 S.E.E. = 0.33744 
D-W Test =2.17 
(3) Naive Model (current price) 
A = 4.93041 + 0.96616 11® 
(0.17551) 
r2 ^ ^ 31 S.E.E. = 0.33007 
D-W Test =2.39 
For the Nerlovian Expectation Model, a log linear regression 
gives a better result than the simple linear regression one. Using log 
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linear regression, the coefficients of are significantly different 
from zero at 5 per cent significance level. The coefficient of A 
st-1 
is significantly different from zero at 0.05 per cent significance 
level and the coefficient of expectation (3) is found to be 0.06. 
Using simple linear regression, the coefficient of 11^  ^  is insignifi-
cant but that of is significantly different from zero at 0.05 
per cent significance level but 3 is negative. 
2 
For the Naive Model with a one year lagged price, R 
obtained are much lower than those obtained by the Nerlovian Expecta-Q tion Model. However, the coefficient of 11^  is significantly different 
from zero at 0.05 per cent significance level. For the Naive Model 
2 with current price, R obtained is nearly the same as that obtained 
e 
by using one year lagged price. The coefficient of H^ is also signi-
ficantly different from zero at the same significance level as that 
obtained by using one year lagged price. 
2 
The Nerlovian Expectation Model gives a higher R and 
lower standard error of estimate than other models. Simple linear 
regression technique does not seem to work here due to the negative 3 
value obtained. With the log linear regression technique, it yields 
high R^, 3 is positive although very small which means that price for 
as long as, say 20 years, still has an effect on the farmer's 
expectation and the farmer tends to look at the more recent prices 
and bases his price expectation on them. 
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6.8 Elasticity of Response 
For simple linear regression, the short-run elasticities 
of the sugarcane planting area witli respcct to relative gross returns 
are calculated using the formula: 
dA ^ n ^  
dll A . t ^st 
where: 
£ = elasticity of area of sugarcane with respect to relative 
gross returns 
dA ^ st 
— = first order derivative of Ag^ with respect to relative 
t gross returns which is equal to the coefficient of 
(i.e. slope b) 
n and A = mean of the sample values of E and A respectively t st t st 
For the Nerlovian Expectation Model, long-run elasticity 
can be calculated from the following formula: 
e 
n = 
where: 
ri = long-run elasticity 
e = short-run elasticity 
3 = coefficient of expectation 
These coefficients which are not significantly-different 
from zero at an acceptable level of significance (i.e. 5 per cent sig-
nificance level) are assumed to be zero and elasticities were not esti-
mated for them. The elasticities estimated are shown in Table 6.8.1. 
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TABLE 6.8.1 
ELASTICITIES COEFFICIENTS OF SUGARCANE WITH RESPECT TO RELATIVE GROSS RETURNS 
Model 
Nerlovian 
Naive (One Year 
Lagged Price) 
Naive (Two Year 
Average Price) 
Naive (Current 
Price) 
Region 
Eastern 
Whole Kingdom 
Eastern 
Northern 
Whole Kingdom 
Northern 
Eastern 
Northern 
North-Eastern 
Whole Kingdom 
Simple Linear Regression Log Linear Regression 
Short Run^ Long Run^ Short Run 
0.29 
(2.18) 
n. c. 
0. 05 
(2.21) 
4. 05 
(1.27) 
0.88 
(0.17) 
5.52 
(1.96) 
0. 38 
(0.12) 
2.14 
(0.27) 
0.73 
(0.17) 
1.00 
(0.07) 
Lona Run 
0'.83 n. c. 
0.14 
(0.08) 
0.49 
(0.23) 
3.30 
(1.13) 
0.98 
(0.19) 
4.79 
(1.80) 
0.38 
(0.17) 
2.00 
(0.33) 
0.64 
(0.23) 
1.00 
(0.18) 
2.33 
to U) 
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Short-run elasticities with respect to relative gross 
returns range from 0.05 in the Eastern region when one year lagged 
price is used as the expected price, to 5.52 in the Northern Region 
when two year average price is used as the expected price. All 
regions except the Northern Region have elasticity values less than 1, 
As for the whole kingdom, the elasticities obtained range from 0.14 
when the Nerlovian Expectation Model is applied, to 1.00 when current 
price is applied. For the majority of the regions (except the 
Northern Region) where elasticities are less than 1, this means that 
a 1 per cent increase in relative gross returns brings forth less 
than 1 per cent increase in area planted to sugarcane and a 1 per 
cent decrease in relative gross returns brings forth less than a 
1 per cent decrease in area planted to sugarcane. Farmers in the 
Northern Region seem to respond more to changes in relative gross 
return in view of the higher elasticities obtained no matter which 
model or technique is used.^ 
The poor results obtained from this study are due to 
limitation in the number of observations as can be observed when 
four regions are grouped together - the majority of coefficients 
become significant at the same significance level. Furthermore, 
there are many explanatory variables that are left out. The rain-
fall at the sowing period, the influence of the Sugarcane Farmers' 
Association, and the others which have been mentioned in Section 5.2 
in Chapter 5. Unreliability of these data and measurement errors 
3 Regression with relative area as dependent variable was also 
tried but the results obtained were very poor from statistics 
and economics standpoints. 
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may be the reason for low R obtained for most of the regions no 
matter which model is postulated or technique is used. Several 
competing crops of sugarcane have been left out. For example, in 
Kanchanaburi (a province in Central Region), another important com-
peting crop is tobacco. Soy beans are also becoming an important 
competing crop. Even within the same region, competing crops differ 
from province to province. There are more competing crops in the 
Central Region, which alone covers 69 per cent of the total sugar-
cane planted area, than in the other regions. This may be the reason 
why all of the proposed models did not work in the case of the 
Central Region. There are several other reasons that may explain 
the poor results obtained from the study. Unreliability of data may 
be one of the reasons. There is so much doubt about the quality of 
the data collected by the statistical officers because one does not 
know what is going on behind the scenes between the officers and 
factory owners or betwe,en the officers and quotamen. 
In addition, the model estimated is a simplified one, 
depending on certain assumptions. This simplified model is not so 
different from the other models reviewed in Chapter 2, except that 
certain assumptions underlying their models have not been explicitly 
spelled out. The estimated model from the simplified model may be 
one of the reasons why the result is poor. Had we had a longer time 
series, we could have applied the simplified model proposed in 
Section 6.2, i.e.: 
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where: 
Aa^^ = change in area planted to sugarcane in period t 
n^, = relative gross returns (expected) in periods t and 
t-3 respectively 
The results obtained would have been even better, more 
valuable and more adequate, had one had data on other variables, 
for example cost of inputs, new planting data, removal data, etc. so 
that the general model proposed in Chapter 5 could have been applied, 
i.e. : 
NP^ = f(S, P , P , C, Y , Y , R, G, 0, W, Q) t s c s c 
where : 
NP^ = new planting in year t 
S = stock of sugarcane, i.e. new planting in years t-1 and t-2 
P = expected prices of sugarcane in year t s 
P = expected price of competing crop in year t c 
C = expected cost of input 
Y = expected yield of sugarcane in year t 
Y = expected yield of competing crops in year t c 
R = area under sugarcane removed in year to which, under the 
assumption of no dam.aged plants, is the area planted in 
year t-3 
G = Government intervention 
O = existence of Sugarcane Farmers' Association 
W = weather conditions 
Q = quotaman's activity 
It is hoped to be able to undertake such a study in the 
future when a longer time series relating to these variables mentioned 
earlier becomes available. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Although empirical supply response studies are a useful 
tool in the formulation of economic policies, the author is not aware 
of such studies having been attempted for sugarcane in Thailand. As 
a starting point, this study reviews the supply response studies 
relating to this crop in India and comments upon their results in 
Chapter 2. The main shortcoming of these studies seem to be their 
failure to explicitly treat sugarment as a perennial crop. Conse-
quently, an examination of the main theoretical models of supply 
response for such crops was undertaken in Chapter 4. This was 
followed in Chapter 5 by postulating a general model for sugarcane 
in Thailand. However, data limitations necessitated the simplification 
of this model. The simplified and adjusted model together with the 
results obtained are presented in Chapter 6. 
Time series data for eight years from 1968 to 1975 were 
used to estimate a supply response function for sugarcane. Gross 
returns (price times yield) is used as a proxy, i.e. a measure of 
profitability. Both the naive and the Nerlovian Models are used to 
form price expectations. Predicted yield is used instead of actual 
yield. The results obtained were fairly poor due to the limited 
number of observations and the unreliability of the available data. 
Use of other expectation models was not attempted as it was felt 
that, in view of such data limitations, no matter what techniques or 
models were used the empirical results would not be very satisfactory. 
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The elasticity of supply of sugarcane with respect to 
relative gross returns was calculated only for those coefficients 
which were significantly different from zero at a significance level 
of 5 per cent or less and when the coefficient was of the expected 
sign (i.e. positive according to economic theory). Elasticity for 
the Central Region was, therefore, not estimated. It was found that 
farmers in the Eastern and North-Eastern Regions have short-run elasti-
cities of less than 1 which means that a 1 per cent change in rela-
tive gross returns brings forth less than a 1 per cent change in area 
planted to sugarcane. When farmers expect low relative gross returns 
(i.e. price of sugarcane is low relative to price of competing crops) 
they will reduce the area planted to sugarcane; the released area will 
be put to the available competing crop deemed to be more profitable. 
However, the relative change in the area released to the competing 
crop will be less than in the Northern Region where supply response is 
more elastic (estimated values range from 2.14 to 5.52 and 2.00 to 
4.79 with Simple Linear Regression and Long Linear Regression 
respectively depending on expectation model used). 
Results and hence conclusions must be considered pre-
liminary at this stage. When more detailed data can be collected the 
full model developed in this study can then be estimated and, hopefully, 
more meaningful results can be obtained. 
APPENDIX A 
AREA, PRICE AND YIELD OF SUGARCANE IN THE FOUR REGIONS 
Central Region Eastern Region Northern Region North--Eastern Region 
Year Area 
(Rai) 
Price^ 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
2 
Yield 
(Tonne) 
Area 
(Rai) 
Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
Area 
(Rai) 
Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
Area 
(Rai) 
Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
1967/68 202,032 204.89 6.98 163,181 223.63 6.79 35,064 118.01 4.71 47,500 158.68 4. 37 
1968/69 315,207 157.01 7.18 235,076 150.63 6.96 32,739 126.59 5.03 63,221 122.10 4.55 
1969/70 393,181 135.09 7. 38 244,599 140.92 7.13 37,764 130.37 5.36 63,039 123.97 4. 74 
1970/71 545,025 145.87 7.57 223,529 146.30 7.31 44,285 126.32 5.69 48,967 130.09 4.92 
1971/72 573,371 149.75 7.77 208,377 156.95 7.50 41,664 131.91 6.01 49,508 133.04 5.10 
1972/73 712,213 182.36 7.97 290,609 182.98 7.65 56,821 155.08 6. 34 73,796 138.76 5.28 
1973/74 1,029,558 203.61 8.20 352,214 200.79 7.82 142,758 177.79 6.67 90,774 168.74 5.46 
1974/75 1,178,480 300.65 8.37 390,000 300.70 8.00 225, 019 292.39 6.99 141,754 276.32 5. 64 
1 Factory price 
2 Expected yield 
Source: Sugar Institute, Ministry of Industry, 
NJ 
APPENDIX B.l 
PRICE AND YIELD OF COMPETING CROPS IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN REGIONS 
Central Region Eastern Region 
Year Rice Maize Cassava Maize Mungbean 
Cassava 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
. 2 Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
^ . 2 Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
. 2 Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
Yield^ 
(Tonne) 
^ . 2 Price 
(Baht/ 
Tonne) 
1967/68 0.31 
1 
715.50 0.28 870.00* 2. 28 400.00 0.32 870.00 0.18 2,859.38 2.46 400.00 
1968/69 0.30 666.10 0. 30 821.40 2.31 330.00 0. 33 821.40 0.18 2,519.40 2.40 330.00 
1969/70 0.30 642.80 0.31 878.70 2. 33 540.00 0.34 878.70 0.18 2,354.70 2. 34 540.00 
1970/71 0.30 440.80 0.33 806.70 2. 36 470.00 0.35 806.70 0.18 2,530.00 2.28 470.00 
1971/72 0.29 615.20 0.34 870.00 2.38 520.00 0.36 870.00 0.18 2,94 0.00 2.22 520.00 
1972/73 0.29 1,006.50 0. 36 1,440.00 2.41 410.00 0. 37 1,440.00 0.18 3, 760.00 2.16 470.00 
1973/74 0.28 1,276.10 0.37 1,680.00 2.43 340.00 0. 38 1,680.00 0.18 3,810.00 2.10 340. 00 
1974/75 0.28 1,4 54.69 0.39 1,850.00 2.46 300.00 0.39 1,850.00 0.18 3,850.00 2. 04 300.00 
1 
2 
3 * 
Expected yield 
Regional farm price 
Whole kingdom farm price 
Estimated figure 
Source: Division of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agricultural and Cooperatives. U) o 
APPENDIX B.2 
PRICE AND YIELD OF COMPETING CROPS IN THE NORTHERN AND NORTH-EASTERN REGIONS 
Northern Reg ion North-Eastern Region 
Year Ca ssava Mungbean Cassava Mungbean 
Yield^ Price^ Yield^ . 2 Price Yield^ Price^ Yield^ . 2 Prxce 
(Tonne) (Baht/Tonne) (Tonne) (Baht/Tonne) (Tonne) (Baht/Tonne) (Tonne) (Baht/Tonne) 
1967/68 2.09 400.00 0.18 2,414.70 2.11 400.00 0.16 2,492.00 
1968/69 2.08 330.00 0.18 2,420.00 2.24 330.00 0.16 2,432.00 
1969/70 2 .07 540.00 0.18 2,295.33* 2. 32 540.00 0.16 2,396.00 
1970/71 2.07 470.00 0.17 2,220.00 2.40 470.00 0.15 2,330.00 
1971/72 2.06 520.00 0.17 2,340.00 2.48 520.00 0.15 2,370.00 
1972/73 2.05 470.00 0.17 3,020.00 2.57 470.00 0.15 2,670.00 
1973/74 2.04 340.00 0.16 3,140.00* 2.65 340.00 0.15 3,250.00 
1974/75 2.03 300.00 0.16 3,440.00 2. 73 300.00 0.15 3,540.00 
1 Expected yield 
2 Regional farm price 
3 Whole kingdom farm price 
* Estimated figure 
Source: Division of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
APPENDIX C 
AREA (%) OF COMPETING CROPS 
Central Region Eastern Region 
Year 
Rice Maize Cassava Maize Mungbean Cassava 
1967 /68 0 . 94 0 . 04 0 . 02 
( 0 . 78) (0 . 23) 
1968 /69 0. 97 0 . 01 0 . 02 
(0 . 40) (0 . 60) 
1969 /70 0. 95 0 . 03 0 . 02 
( 0 . 71) (0 . 29) 
1970 /71 0. 96 0. 02 0. 02 
(0 . 53) (0 . 47) 
1971 /72 0. 91 0. 04 0. 05 
(0 . .47) (0 . 53) 
1972 /73 0. ,92 0. .05 0. 03 
(0 . .66) (0 . .34) 
1973 /74 0. .93 0. .06 0. ,01 
(0, .82) (0 . .18) 
1974 /75 0. .92 0, .06 0. .02 
(0. .78) (0 . .22) 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 3 
0.01 
0 .04 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0 .03 0 .01 
0 .03 0 .01 
0 .03 0 . 0 0 
0 . 9 8 
0 . 9 6 
1.00 
0 . 9 8 
0 . 9 5 
0 . 9 6 
0 . 9 6 
0 . 9 7 
Northern Region 
Cassava Mungbean 
0 . 0 7 0 .93 
0 . 0 3 0 . 9 7 
0 . 0 4 0 . 9 6 
0 . 0 6 0 .94 
0 . 1 3 0 .87 
0 . 1 5 0 .85 
0 . 1 1 0 .89 
0 . 1 5 0 .85 
North-Eastern Region 
Cassava Mungbean 
0 . 6 0 0 . 4 0 
0 . 7 7 0 . 2 3 
0 . 7 9 0 . 2 1 
0 . 9 2 0 . 0 8 
0 . 9 8 0 . 0 2 
0 . 9 7 0 . 0 3 
0 . 9 6 0 . 0 4 
0 . 9 8 0 . 0 2 
Figures in brackets are area (%) when rice is not included as a competing crop in the Central Region. 
Source: Division of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. U) NJ 
APPENDIX D 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR YIELD 
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Central Region Eastern Region 
(1) Sugarcane: 
R^ = 0 .06388 
a = 1 .96369 
b = 0 .01330 
(0 .02078) 
S . E . E . = 0 .13470 
(1) Sugarcane: 
R^ = 0.61001 
a = 1 .73522 
b = 0 .05378 
(0.01755) 
S . E . E . = 0 .11377 
(2) Rice: 
R^ = 0 .03953 
a = -1.16576 
b = -0.01280 
(0.02576) 
S . E . E . = 0 .16695 
(2) Maize: 
R = 0.55126 
a = -1.28887 
b - 0.04966 
(0 .01829) 
S . E . E . = 0.11854 
(3) Maize: 
R^ - 0 .15429 
a = -1.45923 
b - 0.05773 
(0,05518) 
S . E . E . = 0 . 3 5760 
(3) Mungbean: 
R^ = 0.24771 
a = -1.69323 
b = -0.00806 
(0.00573) 
S . E . E . = 0.03714 
(4) Cassava: 
R^ = 0 .07388 
a = 0.62734 
b , = 0 .03373 
(0.04875) 
S . E . E . = 0 .31595 
(4) Cassava: 
R^ = 0 .37732 
a = 1 .10895 
b = -0.0604 7 
(0 .03171) 
S . E . E . = 0 .20552 
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Northern Region 
(1) Sugarcane: 
R^ = 0.77035 
a = 1.24102 
b = 0.08295 
(0.01849) 
S . E . E . = 0.11983 
North-Eastern Region 
(1) Sugarcane: 
R^ = 0.45179 
a - 1.33880 
b - 0.04028 
(0.01811) 
S . E . E . = 0.11740 
(2) Cassava: 
R^ = 0.00878 
a = 0.79773 
b - -0.00732 
(0.03174) 
S . E . E . = 0.20572 
(2) Cassava: 
R^ = 0.16269 
a = 0.70292 
b = 0.03284 
(0.03041) 
S . E . E . = 0.19709 
(3) Mungbean: 
R^ - 0.11194 
a = -2.03386 
b = 0.02235 
(0.02570) 
(3) Mungbean: 
R^ = 0.02969 
a = -1.94789 
b = 0.01335 
(0.03115) 
S .E .E . = 0.16657 S .E .E . = 0.20189 
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